daniel jochum (11 risultati)

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Paperback. Condizione: Brand New. 335 pages. 8.26x5.82x8.27 inches. In Stock.

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. The German Federal Commissioner | An Institutionally Hybrid Office, its Holders, and their Recruitment | Daniel Jochum | Taschenbuch | Interdisziplinäre Organisations- und Verwaltungsforschung | xxv | Englisch | 2025 | Springer VS | EAN 9783658488444 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer VS in Springer Science + Business Media, Abraham-Lincoln-Str. 46, 65189 Wiesbaden, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu.

Condizione: New.

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Scholars have described the delegation of power from politics to administration with the help of the principal-agent theory. This framework examines challenges in the constellation of a superior, i.e. principal, and their subordinate, i.e. agent. Recruitment is a major way in which political power can be delegated to the administration. However, it is unclear how constellations in which the agent is a hybrid between politics and administration are to be assessed. Germany is familiar with the hybrid institution of the German Federal Commissioner (GFC), uniting elements of both politics and administration. GFCs or Bundesbeauftragte are formally not part of ministerial hierarchy, nor of the cabinet. Also, their constitutional position is blurred because many of them hold simultaneous posts within in the legislative. For this hybrid institution, the delegation mechanisms are unclear, especially in recruitment. This contradicts the fact that GFCs are of high public interest; in its first official act, the new German Merz government abolished half of all GFCs. The present study attempts to get to the bottom GFC recruitment by applying them to the principal-agent framework.

Condizione: new. Questo è un articolo print on demand.

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -Scholars have described the delegation of power from politics to administration with the help of the principal-agent theory. This framework examines challenges in the constellation of a superior, i.e. principal, and their subordinate, i.e. agent. Recruitment is a major way in which political power can be delegated to the administration. However, it is unclear how constellations in which the agent is a hybrid between politics and administration are to be assessed. Germany is familiar with the hybrid institution of the German Federal Commissioner (GFC), uniting elements of both politics and administration. GFCs or Bundesbeauftragte are formally not part of ministerial hierarchy, nor of the cabinet. Also, their constitutional position is blurred because many of them hold simultaneous posts within in the legislative. For this hybrid institution, the delegation mechanisms are unclear, especially in recruitment. This contradicts the fact that GFCs are of high public interest; in its first official act, the new German Merz government abolished half of all GFCs. The present study attempts to get to the bottom GFC recruitment by applying them to the principal-agent framework. 358 pp. Englisch.

Condizione: New. Print on Demand.

Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. Scholars have described the delegation of power from politics to administration with the help of the principal-agent theory. This framework examines challenges in the constellation of a superior, i.e. principal, and their subordinate, i.e. agent. Recruitment is a major way in which political power can be delegated to the administration. However, it is unclear how constellations in which the agent is a hybrid between politics and administration are to be assessed. Germany is familiar with the hybrid institution of the German Federal Commissioner (GFC), uniting elements of both politics and administration. GFCs or Bundesbeauftragte are formally not part of ministerial hierarchy, nor of the cabinet. Also, their constitutional position is blurred because many of them hold simultaneous posts within in the legislative. For this hybrid institution, the delegation mechanisms are unclear, especially in recruitment. This contradicts the fact that GFCs are of high public interest; in its first official act, the new German Merz government abolished half of all GFCs. The present study attempts to get to the bottom GFC recruitment by applying them to the principal-agent framework. Scholars have described the delegation of power from politics to administration with the help of the principal-agent theory. Germany is familiar with the hybrid institution of the German Federal Commissioner (GFC), uniting elements of both politics and administration. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Condizione: New. PRINT ON DEMAND.

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -Scholars have described the delegation of power from politics to administration with the help of the principal-agent theory. This framework examines challenges in the constellation of a superior, i.e. principal, and their subordinate, i.e. agent. Recruitment is a major way in which political power can be delegated to the administration. However, it is unclear how constellations in which the agent is a hybrid between politics and administration are to be assessed. Germany is familiar with the hybrid institution of the German Federal Commissioner (GFC), uniting elements of both politics and administration. GFCs or 'Bundesbeauftragte' are formally not part of ministerial hierarchy, nor of the cabinet. Also, their constitutional position is blurred because many of them hold simultaneous posts within in the legislative. For this hybrid institution, the delegation mechanisms are unclear, especially in recruitment. This contradicts the fact that GFCs are of high public interest; in its first official act, the new German Merz government abolished half of all GFCs. The present study attempts to get to the bottom GFC recruitment by applying them to the principal-agent framework.Springer-Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg 384 pp. Englisch.