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Paperback or Softback. Condizione: New. Capital Ship: An Operational Perspective. Book.

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Condizione: New. KlappentextrnrnThe US being a maritime nation, protected yet separated from the world by oceans, has needed the oceans as highways for economic and military power projection. A fundamental requirement for power projection is the command of the s.

PAP. Condizione: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

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Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Neuware - The idea of interdicting lines of communication, restricting the employment of reserve forces, destroying supply bases, or cutting off routes of withdrawal has been the object of deep operations throughout the history of modern warfare. This paper seeks to address the implications of deep operations doctrine in regard to maneuver capability. It begins by exploring the concepts of deep operations through the analysis of military theorists like Carl von Clausewitz, J.F.C. Fuller, B.H. Liddell Hart, Don Starry and Richard Simpkin. Next, it validates the deep operations concept by examining the theory's implementation by the Germans in Russia, 1941, the U.S. 4th Armored Division in Western Europe, 1944 and more recently by the Israelis in the Sinai, 1967. Finally, this study reviews the evolution of contemporary deep operations doctrine. It explores the dynamic balance between firepower and maneuver and how the nature of battle continues to change as each takes the dominant role. The concept of deep operations is still valid in contemporary warfare. However, at present we are relying on technology to provide a firepower solution to deep operations at the expense of maneuver. This firepower solution provides the enemy with a one dimensional, relatively simple problem to solve. The paper concludes that success on the modern battlefield will come only from a balanced approach of fires and maneuver in the deep battle.

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Neuware - The US being a maritime nation, protected yet separated from the world by oceans, has needed the oceans as highways for economic and military power projection. A fundamental requirement for power projection is the command of the sea. Having command means having control of ocean transit, securing it for one's self and one's allies while denying it to the enemy. Command of the sea is seized and maintained by a strong navy centered around powerful warships. These powerful warships--capital ships--have evolved over time, constantly shaped by mission, threat, geography, technology and resources. From the Constitution-class frigates at the founding of the Navy to the nuclear powered aircraft carriers of today, US Navy fleets have centered around the capital ship. A reciprocal relationship exists between the capital ship and the posture of the Navy. This paper seeks to determine to what degree the capital ship has determined the strategic and operational posture. It begins by offering a tentative definition of the capital ship through examination of the thoughts of key naval theorists, particularly Bernard Brodie, Alfred T. Mahan and Clark Reynolds. From this point of departure the paper examines the evolution of the capital ship in the U.S. Navy from 1794 to the present. Based on the assembled theoretical and practical evidence, the paper then presents a comprehensive definition of the capital ship. The paper then explores the concept of command of the sea and examines the relationship between the capital ship and the posture of the Navy in attaining that command. The paper concludes with the notion that the capital ship and the posture of the Navy are reciprocal, that the capital ship is both creator and creation of the Navy's operational and strategic posture. In an age of uncertainty where the U.S. Navy must be prepared for a wide variety of potential conflicts, its capital ship and posture at the onset of conflict will dictate how it will fight the war.

PAP. Condizione: New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

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Buch. Condizione: Neu. Neuware - The idea of interdicting lines of communication, restricting the employment of reserve forces, destroying supply bases, or cutting off routes of withdrawal has been the object of deep operations throughout the history of modern warfare. This paper seeks to address the implications of deep operations doctrine in regard to maneuver capability. It begins by exploring the concepts of deep operations through the analysis of military theorists like Carl von Clausewitz, J.F.C. Fuller, B.H. Liddell Hart, Don Starry and Richard Simpkin. Next, it validates the deep operations concept by examining the theory's implementation by the Germans in Russia, 1941, the U.S. 4th Armored Division in Western Europe, 1944 and more recently by the Israelis in the Sinai, 1967. Finally, this study reviews the evolution of contemporary deep operations doctrine. It explores the dynamic balance between firepower and maneuver and how the nature of battle continues to change as each takes the dominant role. The concept of deep operations is still valid in contemporary warfare. However, at present we are relying on technology to provide a firepower solution to deep operations at the expense of maneuver. This firepower solution provides the enemy with a one dimensional, relatively simple problem to solve. The paper concludes that success on the modern battlefield will come only from a balanced approach of fires and maneuver in the deep battle.

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Condizione: New. Print on Demand pp. 54.

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Paperback / softback. Condizione: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days.

HRD. Condizione: New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

Condizione: New. Print on Demand.

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Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. The idea of interdicting lines of communication, restricting the employment of reserve forces, destroying supply bases, or cutting off routes of withdrawal has been the object of deep operations throughout the history of modern warfare. This paper seeks to address the implications of deep operations doctrine in regard to maneuver capability. It begins by exploring the concepts of deep operations through the analysis of military theorists like Carl von Clausewitz, J.F.C. Fuller, B.H. Liddell Hart, Don Starry and Richard Simpkin. Next, it validates the deep operations concept by examining the theory's implementation by the Germans in Russia, 1941, the U.S. 4th Armored Division in Western Europe, 1944 and more recently by the Israelis in the Sinai, 1967. Finally, this study reviews the evolution of contemporary deep operations doctrine. It explores the dynamic balance between firepower and maneuver and how the nature of battle continues to change as each takes the dominant role. The concept of deep operations is still valid in contemporary warfare. However, at present we are relying on technology to provide a firepower solution to deep operations at the expense of maneuver. This firepower solution provides the enemy with a one dimensional, relatively simple problem to solve. The paper concludes that success on the modern battlefield will come only from a balanced approach of fires and maneuver in the deep battle.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Hardcover. Condizione: new. Hardcover. The idea of interdicting lines of communication, restricting the employment of reserve forces, destroying supply bases, or cutting off routes of withdrawal has been the object of deep operations throughout the history of modern warfare. This paper seeks to address the implications of deep operations doctrine in regard to maneuver capability. It begins by exploring the concepts of deep operations through the analysis of military theorists like Carl von Clausewitz, J.F.C. Fuller, B.H. Liddell Hart, Don Starry and Richard Simpkin. Next, it validates the deep operations concept by examining the theory's implementation by the Germans in Russia, 1941, the U.S. 4th Armored Division in Western Europe, 1944 and more recently by the Israelis in the Sinai, 1967. Finally, this study reviews the evolution of contemporary deep operations doctrine. It explores the dynamic balance between firepower and maneuver and how the nature of battle continues to change as each takes the dominant role. The concept of deep operations is still valid in contemporary warfare. However, at present we are relying on technology to provide a firepower solution to deep operations at the expense of maneuver. This firepower solution provides the enemy with a one dimensional, relatively simple problem to solve. The paper concludes that success on the modern battlefield will come only from a balanced approach of fires and maneuver in the deep battle.This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.