Edward geist (59 risultati)

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PAP. Condizione: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

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PAP. Condizione: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

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Paperback. Condizione: Brand New. 288 pages. 6.22x0.63x9.29 inches. In Stock.

Paperback. Condizione: New. The dangerous, decades-long arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War begged a fundamental question: how did these superpowers actually plan to survive a nuclear strike? In Armageddon Insurance, the first historical account of Soviet civil defense and a pioneering reappraisal of its American counterpart, Edward M. Geist compares how the two superpowers tried, and mostly failed, to reinforce their societies to withstand the ultimate catastrophe.Drawing on previously unexamined documents from archives in America, Russia, and Ukraine, Geist places these civil defense programs in their political and cultural contexts, demonstrating how each country's efforts reflected its cultural preoccupations and blind spots, and revealing how American and Soviet civil defense related to profound issues of nuclear strategy and national values. This work challenges prevailing historical assumptions and unearths the ways Moscow and Washington developed nuclear weapons policies based not on rational strategic or technical considerations, but in power struggles between different institutions pursuing their own narrow self-interests.…

Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. For decades, films such as WarGames and The Terminator have warned that the combination of artificial intelligence and nuclear weapons might be a recipe for an apocalypse. Might these prophecies of doom become reality in coming decades?Using insights from computer science, Deterrence under Uncertainty: Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear Warfare evaluates how AI could make nuclear war winnable, and whether thatpossibility is likely. Detailed chapters explain how the landscape of nuclear deterrence is changing and debunks the myths of machine intelligence and nuclear weapons. This book gives a practitioner's perspective on how artificialintelligence (AI) and other emerging technologies could change the role of nuclear weapons in international relations. A practitioner's perspective on how artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies could change the role of nuclear weapons in international relations. Geist argues that artificial intelligence could make a huge impact on deterrence and strategic stability even if it does not render retaliatory forces vulnerable. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.…

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Trade paperback. Condizione: Very good. No DJ issued. Presumed First Edition, First printing. xvii, [1], 133, [1] pages. Footnotes. Figures. Tables. Appendices. References. Minor cover soiling noted. Despite its global advantages, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) s current deterrent posture in the Baltic states is militarily weak and generally questionable. A Russian invasion there would almost surely capture some or all of those states' capital cities within a few days, presenting NATO with a fait accompli. This report examines what role nonstrategic nuclear weapons could play in deterring such an invasion. To achieve deterrence-favorable conditions, NATO would need to consider substantially enhancing and improving its conventional forces based in and near the Baltic states; fielding some limited nonstrategic nuclear weapons feasible for use throughout a conflict, including very early in the conflict; and going through the lengthy and difficult political and military peacetime processes necessary to make prompt response to warnings feasible and credible. What would be an action plan to develop and practice rapid-decision and rapid-action processes to prevent a surprise fait accompli despite major deception operations by Russia (e.g., using exercises to cover preparations for invasion)? How would wargaming results change if the initiating scenario resembled the little green men (masked soldiers in unmarked uniforms) employed by Russia in Ukraine in 2014? Are there ways that limited nuclear use by NATO could be given military value despite Russian quantitative escalation dominance? What options exist for geographically horizontal escalation and for escalation into other domains? Despite its global advantages, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)'s current deterrent posture in the Baltic states is militarily weak and generally questionable. A Russian invasion there would almost surely capture some or all of those states' capital cities within a few days, presenting NATO with a fait accompli. The United States is currently considering tailored deterrence strategies, including options to use nuclear weapons to deter Russian aggression in the Baltic states. This report examines what role nonstrategic nuclear weapons could play in deterring such an invasion. As part of that analysis, the authors review relevant deterrence theory and current NATO and Russian nuclear and conventional force postures in Europe. They draw on wargame exercises and qualitative modeling to characterize the potential outcomes if NATO, Russia, or both employ nonstrategic nuclear weapons during a war in the Baltic states. The authors then discuss implications for using such weapons to deter a Russian invasion. The insights derived from the research highlight the reality that, even if NATO makes significant efforts to modernize its nonstrategic nuclear weapons, it would have much stronger military incentives to end a future war than Russia would. That is, Russia would still enjoy escalation dominance. The do-nothing option is very risky: NATO's current deterrent in the Baltic states is militarily weak and generally questionable. Improvements to conventional forces have the highest priority; they could also enhance the value of some nuclear options. Some of these improvements are underway. Practiced options for extremely fast response without much strategic warning are important because Russia might otherwise find ways, using deception, to accomplish a short-warning fait accompli. Despite Russia's regional escalation dominance, the modernized nuclear options might be valuable in certain circumstances of crisis or conflict if Russian leaders have not already anticipated and discounted the significance of NATO's nuclear use (whether a first use or in response to Russian first use). Given the limited military value for modernized NATO nonstrategic nuclear weapons, some may question the priority of pursuing such modernization. However, modernized nuclear options would reduce Russian asymmetries in theater-nuclear matters, which can be significant to public and international perceptions. Also, reducing nonstrategic nuclear weapon asymmetries might cause NATO allies to feel more assured of the credibility of U.S. security guarantees and might improve U.S. leverage in possible negotiations about nonstrategic nuclear weapons (the United States has very little leverage now). Finally, modernized nuclear options might be necessary for dealing with security challenges other than Russia.Recommendations.…

Paperback. Condizione: New. The dangerous, decades-long arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War begged a fundamental question: how did these superpowers actually plan to survive a nuclear strike? In Armageddon Insurance, the first historical account of Soviet civil defense and a pioneering reappraisal of its American counterpart, Edward M. Geist compares how the two superpowers tried, and mostly failed, to reinforce their societies to withstand the ultimate catastrophe.Drawing on previously unexamined documents from archives in America, Russia, and Ukraine, Geist places these civil defense programs in their political and cultural contexts, demonstrating how each country's efforts reflected its cultural preoccupations and blind spots, and revealing how American and Soviet civil defense related to profound issues of nuclear strategy and national values. This work challenges prevailing historical assumptions and unearths the ways Moscow and Washington developed nuclear weapons policies based not on rational strategic or technical considerations, but in power struggles between different institutions pursuing their own narrow self-interests.…

Condizione: New. In English.

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PF. Condizione: New.

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Paperback. Condizione: Brand New. 288 pages. 6.22x0.63x9.29 inches. In Stock.

Paperback. Condizione: Brand New. 320 pages. 9.25x6.00x0.75 inches. In Stock.

Condizione: good. This is a withdrawn library or rental book. It is stamped or stickered.

Paperback. Condizione: New. The dangerous, decades-long arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War begged a fundamental question: how did these superpowers actually plan to survive a nuclear strike? In Armageddon Insurance, the first historical account of Soviet civil defense and a pioneering reappraisal of its American counterpart, Edward M. Geist compares how the two superpowers tried, and mostly failed, to reinforce their societies to withstand the ultimate catastrophe.Drawing on previously unexamined documents from archives in America, Russia, and Ukraine, Geist places these civil defense programs in their political and cultural contexts, demonstrating how each country's efforts reflected its cultural preoccupations and blind spots, and revealing how American and Soviet civil defense related to profound issues of nuclear strategy and national values. This work challenges prevailing historical assumptions and unearths the ways Moscow and Washington developed nuclear weapons policies based not on rational strategic or technical considerations, but in power struggles between different institutions pursuing their own narrow self-interests.…

Otros. Condizione: New. Condizione sovraccoperta: Nuevo. 01. Porque convocamos el pasado desde múltiples lugares. Porque el ayer irrumpe en nosotros desde numerosas orillas. Porque nuestra posición de observadores es frágil y dúctil. Porque nos mueven los diversos lenguajes con los que se teje el pretérito, desde la imagen a la fotografía, desde el texto escrito a la narración oral. Porque consideramos la poética de la historia y la memoria como ariete para la retórica. Porque aceptamos la debilidad de la fortaleza académica pero no nos detenemos en reparar sus grietas (.). LIBRO.…