Hardcover. Condizione: Very Good. Very Good - Crisp, clean, unread book with some shelfwear/edgewear, may have a remainder mark - NICE Standard-sized.
Paperback. Condizione: Very Good. Very Good - Crisp, clean, unread book with some shelfwear/edgewear, may have a remainder mark - NICE Standard-sized.
Paperback. Condizione: Good. Good - Bumped and creased book with tears to the extremities, but not affecting the text block, may have remainder mark or previous owner's name - GOOD PAPERBACK Standard-sized.
Hardcover. Condizione: Very Good+. Condizione sovraccoperta: Very Good+. Very lightly crimped corners, otherwise text clean and tight; Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare; 9.10 X 5.90 X 1 inches; 248 pages.
Hardcover. Condizione: Good. Good - Bumped and creased book with tears to the extremities, but not affecting the text block, may have remainder mark or previous owner's name - GOOD Standard-sized.
Condizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.
Lingua: Inglese
Editore: Columbia University Press, US, 2015
ISBN 10: 0231164270 ISBN 13: 9780231164276
Da: Rarewaves.com USA, London, LONDO, Regno Unito
EUR 33,38
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Aggiungi al carrelloPaperback. Condizione: New. Long considered the masters of counterinsurgency, the British military encountered significant problems in Iraq and Afghanistan when confronted with insurgent violence. In their effort to apply the principles and doctrines of past campaigns, they failed to prevent Basra and Helmand from descending into lawlessness, criminality, and violence. By juxtaposing the deterioration of these situations against Britain's celebrated legacy of counterinsurgency, this investigation identifies both the contributions and limitations of traditional tactics in such settings, exposing a disconcerting gap between ambitions and resources, intent and commitment. Building upon this detailed account of the Basra and Helmand campaigns, this volume conducts an unprecedented assessment of British military institutional adaptation in response to operations gone awry. In calling attention to the enduring effectiveness of insurgent methods and the threat posed by undergoverned spaces, David H. Ucko and Robert Egnell underscore the need for military organizations to meet the irregular challenges of future wars in new ways.
Condizione: New.
Da: Majestic Books, Hounslow, Regno Unito
EUR 32,40
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Aggiungi al carrelloCondizione: New. pp. 248.
Da: THE SAINT BOOKSTORE, Southport, Regno Unito
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Aggiungi al carrelloPaperback / softback. Condizione: New. New copy - Usually dispatched within 4 working days.
Da: Books Puddle, New York, NY, U.S.A.
Condizione: New. pp. 248.
Da: GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, Regno Unito
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Aggiungi al carrelloPaperback. Condizione: Brand New. reprint edition. 221 pages. 9.00x6.00x0.50 inches. In Stock.
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Aggiungi al carrelloCondizione: New. Long considered the masters of counterinsurgency, the British military encountered significant problems in Iraq and Afghanistan when confronted with insurgent violence. In their effort to apply the principles and doctrines of past campaigns, they failed to prevent Basra and Helmand from descending into lawlessness, criminality, and violence. By juxtaposing the deterioration of these situations against Britain's celebrated legacy of counterinsurgency, this investigation identifies both the contributions and limitations of traditional tactics in such settings, exposing a disconcerting gap between ambitions and resources, intent and commitment. Building upon this detailed account of the Basra and Helmand campaigns, this volume conducts an unprecedented assessment of British military institutional adaptation in response to operations gone awry. In calling attention to the enduring effectiveness of insurgent methods and the threat posed by undergoverned spaces, David H. Ucko and Robert Egnell underscore the need for military organizations to meet the irregular challenges of future wars in new ways.
Lingua: Inglese
Editore: Columbia University Press, US, 2015
ISBN 10: 0231164270 ISBN 13: 9780231164276
Da: Rarewaves.com UK, London, Regno Unito
EUR 28,53
Quantità: 2 disponibili
Aggiungi al carrelloPaperback. Condizione: New. Long considered the masters of counterinsurgency, the British military encountered significant problems in Iraq and Afghanistan when confronted with insurgent violence. In their effort to apply the principles and doctrines of past campaigns, they failed to prevent Basra and Helmand from descending into lawlessness, criminality, and violence. By juxtaposing the deterioration of these situations against Britain's celebrated legacy of counterinsurgency, this investigation identifies both the contributions and limitations of traditional tactics in such settings, exposing a disconcerting gap between ambitions and resources, intent and commitment. Building upon this detailed account of the Basra and Helmand campaigns, this volume conducts an unprecedented assessment of British military institutional adaptation in response to operations gone awry. In calling attention to the enduring effectiveness of insurgent methods and the threat posed by undergoverned spaces, David H. Ucko and Robert Egnell underscore the need for military organizations to meet the irregular challenges of future wars in new ways.
Hardcover. Condizione: New.
Lingua: Inglese
Editore: Columbia University Press, US, 2013
ISBN 10: 0231164262 ISBN 13: 9780231164269
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EUR 121,16
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Aggiungi al carrelloHardback. Condizione: New. Long considered the masters of counterinsurgency, the British military encountered significant problems in Iraq and Afghanistan when confronted with insurgent violence. In their effort to apply the principles and doctrines of past campaigns, they failed to prevent Basra and Helmand from descending into lawlessness, criminality, and violence. By juxtaposing the deterioration of these situations against Britain's celebrated legacy of counterinsurgency, this investigation identifies both the contributions and limitations of traditional tactics in such settings, exposing a disconcerting gap between ambitions and resources, intent and commitment. Building upon this detailed account of the Basra and Helmand campaigns, this volume conducts an unprecedented assessment of British military institutional adaptation in response to operations gone awry. In calling attention to the enduring effectiveness of insurgent methods and the threat posed by undergoverned spaces, David H. Ucko and Robert Egnell underscore the need for military organizations to meet the irregular challenges of future wars in new ways.
Condizione: New.
Condizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.
Lingua: Inglese
Editore: Columbia University Press, US, 2013
ISBN 10: 0231164262 ISBN 13: 9780231164269
Da: Rarewaves USA, OSWEGO, IL, U.S.A.
EUR 127,26
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Aggiungi al carrelloHardback. Condizione: New. Long considered the masters of counterinsurgency, the British military encountered significant problems in Iraq and Afghanistan when confronted with insurgent violence. In their effort to apply the principles and doctrines of past campaigns, they failed to prevent Basra and Helmand from descending into lawlessness, criminality, and violence. By juxtaposing the deterioration of these situations against Britain's celebrated legacy of counterinsurgency, this investigation identifies both the contributions and limitations of traditional tactics in such settings, exposing a disconcerting gap between ambitions and resources, intent and commitment. Building upon this detailed account of the Basra and Helmand campaigns, this volume conducts an unprecedented assessment of British military institutional adaptation in response to operations gone awry. In calling attention to the enduring effectiveness of insurgent methods and the threat posed by undergoverned spaces, David H. Ucko and Robert Egnell underscore the need for military organizations to meet the irregular challenges of future wars in new ways.
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EUR 110,01
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Da: Majestic Books, Hounslow, Regno Unito
EUR 121,15
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Aggiungi al carrelloCondizione: New. pp. 248.
Da: THE SAINT BOOKSTORE, Southport, Regno Unito
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Aggiungi al carrelloHardback. Condizione: New. New copy - Usually dispatched within 4 working days.
Da: Books Puddle, New York, NY, U.S.A.
Condizione: New. pp. 248.
Da: GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, Regno Unito
EUR 125,19
Quantità: 3 disponibili
Aggiungi al carrelloCondizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.
Da: GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, Regno Unito
EUR 125,19
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Aggiungi al carrelloCondizione: New.
Lingua: Inglese
Editore: Columbia University Press, US, 2013
ISBN 10: 0231164262 ISBN 13: 9780231164269
Da: Rarewaves USA United, OSWEGO, IL, U.S.A.
EUR 130,76
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Aggiungi al carrelloHardback. Condizione: New. Long considered the masters of counterinsurgency, the British military encountered significant problems in Iraq and Afghanistan when confronted with insurgent violence. In their effort to apply the principles and doctrines of past campaigns, they failed to prevent Basra and Helmand from descending into lawlessness, criminality, and violence. By juxtaposing the deterioration of these situations against Britain's celebrated legacy of counterinsurgency, this investigation identifies both the contributions and limitations of traditional tactics in such settings, exposing a disconcerting gap between ambitions and resources, intent and commitment. Building upon this detailed account of the Basra and Helmand campaigns, this volume conducts an unprecedented assessment of British military institutional adaptation in response to operations gone awry. In calling attention to the enduring effectiveness of insurgent methods and the threat posed by undergoverned spaces, David H. Ucko and Robert Egnell underscore the need for military organizations to meet the irregular challenges of future wars in new ways.
Lingua: Inglese
Editore: Columbia University Press, US, 2013
ISBN 10: 0231164262 ISBN 13: 9780231164269
Da: Rarewaves.com UK, London, Regno Unito
EUR 114,73
Quantità: 2 disponibili
Aggiungi al carrelloHardback. Condizione: New. Long considered the masters of counterinsurgency, the British military encountered significant problems in Iraq and Afghanistan when confronted with insurgent violence. In their effort to apply the principles and doctrines of past campaigns, they failed to prevent Basra and Helmand from descending into lawlessness, criminality, and violence. By juxtaposing the deterioration of these situations against Britain's celebrated legacy of counterinsurgency, this investigation identifies both the contributions and limitations of traditional tactics in such settings, exposing a disconcerting gap between ambitions and resources, intent and commitment. Building upon this detailed account of the Basra and Helmand campaigns, this volume conducts an unprecedented assessment of British military institutional adaptation in response to operations gone awry. In calling attention to the enduring effectiveness of insurgent methods and the threat posed by undergoverned spaces, David H. Ucko and Robert Egnell underscore the need for military organizations to meet the irregular challenges of future wars in new ways.
Da: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Regno Unito
EUR 184,58
Quantità: 2 disponibili
Aggiungi al carrelloHardcover. Condizione: Brand New. 221 pages. 9.50x6.50x1.00 inches. In Stock.