gabriel steven a (28 risultati)

Soft Cover. Condizione: Very Good. Vol. XX 1975 - 76. 264 pp. Nearly flawless book with minimal external wear save for slight crease on front cover.

Tapa blanda. Condizione: Nuevo.

Soft cover. Condizione: Good. Wackwitz, Brion; Timbrook, Joshua Gabriel; Spencer, Ron; Dan, Smith; Inabinet, Sam; Bridges, John (illustratore). Barnes, Emrey; Brown, Steven; Brucato, Phil; Bryden, Alan; Chupp, Sam; Gavigan, John; Heckel, Harry; Howard, Christopher; Inabinet, Sam; Hideo, Izumi; Key, David; Meyer, Kenneth; Moore, James A.; Neal, George; Robertson, Roderick; Strong, Ryk; Teeuwynn RAGE ACROSS THE WORLD V.1 Clarkston, CA: White Wolf Publishing, Inc. 1997 Good 286pp. 4to. Cover does show shelf wear with light wear and bumping along the edges. Back cover has a 2.5in. tear along the spine and a sticker covering the bar code. Text is clean throughout. Binding inside the front and back cover has cracked and the first inside pages have slightly detached. However, the rest of the text has firm binding throughout the book. Overall, this book is showing its age but still remains in good condition. This is a setting sourcebook for Werewolf: The Apocalypse and includes Caerns: Places of Power and Rage Across Russia. *This book is oversized and will most likely require extra shipping charges.*.

Encuadernación de tapa blanda. Condizione: Bueno. Bueno/ Good.

Hardcover. Condizione: Fine. xiv, 455 p. : ill. ; 24 cm. ; ISBN: 0897664949 (alk. paper); 9780897664943 (alk. paper) ; LCCN: 89-9363 ; OCLC: 19623688 ; stiff paper wrappers ; authors include P W Basham, Robert V Witman, Leonardo Seeber, John G Armbruster, John Adams, Mark & Ma ry Lou Zoback, Edward Woodhouse, Davied Boore, Paul Somerville, Gail Atkinson, Robin McGuire, Gabriel Toro, Daniele Venezano, Luc Chouinard, Ricardo Dobry, R E Weems, S F Obermeier, R B Jacobson, G S Gohn, Martitia P Tuttle, Leonardo Seeber, Steven G Wesnousky, Eugene S Schweig, Silvio K Pezzopane, W j Hall, S L McCabe, M Shinozuka, K Moriyama, Frank E McClure, Guy J P Nordenson, Jack P Moehle, V C Fenton, Glenn R Hill, Thomas A Schwartz, James H Gates, T D O'Rourke, Christopher Rojahn, Chris D Poland, M Elisabeth Pate-Cornell, Rene W Luft, Warner Howe, Charles Scawthorn, and Stephen K Harris ; FINE. Book.

hardcover. Condizione: Very Good.

Soft cover. Condizione: Near Fine. Bridges, John, Inabinet, Sam; SCAR Studios; Smith, Dan; Spencer, Ron; Timbrook, Joshua Gabriel; Wackwitz, Brion; Hampton, Scott (illustratore). Barnes, Emrey; Brown, Steven C.; Brucato, Phil; Bryden, Alan; Chupp, Sam; Gavigan, John; Heckel, Harry; Howard, Christopher; Inabinet, Sam; Hideo, Izumi; Key, David; Meyer, Kenneth; Moore, James A.; Neal, George; Robertson, Roderick; Stron, Ryk; Teeuwyn CAERNS: PLACES OF POWER Clarkston, CA: White Wolf Publishing, Inc. 1994 NF 160pp. 4to. Cover does show shelf wear with light bumping at the spine and corners. There is some light spotted staining inside the front cover and the first page. Text is faintly age toned but otherwise clean. Binding has loosened inside the front and back cover but remains firm throughout. Map laid in the back is clean and in fine condition. Overall book is in great shape and has lasted very well. This is a world sourcebook for Werewolf: The Apocalypse. *This book is oversized and may require extra shipping charges.*.

Condizione: Brand New. New. US edition. Expediting shipping for all USA and Europe orders excluding PO Box. Excellent Customer Service.

Condizione: New. In.

Condizione: New. Brand New Original US Edition. Customer service! Satisfaction Guaranteed.

Condizione: New. In English.

Condizione: New. pp. 656.

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Complementarity Modeling in Energy Markets | Steven A. Gabriel (u. a.) | Taschenbuch | International Series in Operations Research & Management Science | xxvi | Englisch | 2014 | Humana | EAN 9781489986757 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu.

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This addition to the ISOR series introduces complementarity models in a straightforward and approachable manner and uses them to carry out an in-depth analysis of energy markets, including formulation issues and solution techniques. In a nutshell, complementarity models generalize: a. optimization problems via their Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions b. on-cooperative games in which each player may be solving a separate but related optimization problem with potentially overall system constraints (e.g., market-clearing conditions) c. conomic and engineering problems that aren't specifically derived from optimization problems (e.g., spatial price equilibria) d. roblems in which both primal and dual variables (prices) appear in the original formulation (e.g., The National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) or its precursor, PIES). As such, complementarity models are a very general and flexible modeling format. A natural question is why concentrate on energy markets for this complementarity approach s it turns out, energy or other markets that have game theoretic aspects are best modeled by complementarity problems. The reason is that the traditional perfect competition approach no longer applies due to deregulation and restructuring of these markets and thus the corresponding optimization problems may no longer hold. Also, in some instances it is important in the original model formulation to involve both primal variables (e.g., production) as well as dual variables (e.g., market prices) for public and private sector energy planning. Traditional optimization problems can not directly handle this mixing of primal and dual variables but complementarity models can and this makes them all that more effective for decision-makers.

Buch. Condizione: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This addition to the ISOR series introduces complementarity models in a straightforward and approachable manner and uses them to carry out an in-depth analysis of energy markets, including formulation issues and solution techniques. In a nutshell, complementarity models generalize: a. optimization problems via their Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions b. on-cooperative games in which each player may be solving a separate but related optimization problem with potentially overall system constraints (e.g., market-clearing conditions) c. conomic and engineering problems that aren't specifically derived from optimization problems (e.g., spatial price equilibria) d. roblems in which both primal and dual variables (prices) appear in the original formulation (e.g., The National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) or its precursor, PIES). As such, complementarity models are a very general and flexible modeling format. A natural question is why concentrate on energy markets for this complementarity approach s it turns out, energy or other markets that have game theoretic aspects are best modeled by complementarity problems. The reason is that the traditional perfect competition approach no longer applies due to deregulation and restructuring of these markets and thus the corresponding optimization problems may no longer hold. Also, in some instances it is important in the original model formulation to involve both primal variables (e.g., production) as well as dual variables (e.g., market prices) for public and private sector energy planning. Traditional optimization problems can not directly handle this mixing of primal and dual variables but complementarity models can and this makes them all that more effective for decision-makers.

Hardcover. Condizione: New. Brand New! Fast Delivery This is an International Edition and ship within 24-48 hours. Deliver by FedEx and Dhl, & Aramex, UPS, & USPS and we do accept APO and PO BOX Addresses. Order can be delivered worldwide within 7-12 days and we do have flat rate for up to 2LB. Extra shipping charges will be requested if the Book weight is more than 5 LB. This Item May be shipped from India, United states & United Kingdom. Depending on your location and availability.

Condizione: New. Brand New! Fast Delivery This is an International Edition and ship within 24-48 hours. Deliver by FedEx and Dhl, & Aramex, UPS, & USPS and we do accept APO and PO BOX Addresses. Order can be delivered worldwide within 6-10 days and we do have flat rate for up to 2LB. Extra shipping charges will be requested if the Book weight is more than 5 LB. This Item May be shipped from India, United states & United Kingdom. Depending on your location and availability.

Condizione: new. Questo è un articolo print on demand.

Condizione: new. Questo è un articolo print on demand.

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -This addition to the ISOR series introduces complementarity models in a straightforward and approachable manner and uses them to carry out an in-depth analysis of energy markets, including formulation issues and solution techniques. In a nutshell, complementarity models generalize: a. optimization problems via their Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions b. on-cooperative games in which each player may be solving a separate but related optimization problem with potentially overall system constraints (e.g., market-clearing conditions) c. conomic and engineering problems that aren't specifically derived from optimization problems (e.g., spatial price equilibria) d. roblems in which both primal and dual variables (prices) appear in the original formulation (e.g., The National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) or its precursor, PIES). As such, complementarity models are a very general and flexible modeling format. A natural question is why concentrate on energy markets for this complementarity approach s it turns out, energy or other markets that have game theoretic aspects are best modeled by complementarity problems. The reason is that the traditional perfect competition approach no longer applies due to deregulation and restructuring of these markets and thus the corresponding optimization problems may no longer hold. Also, in some instances it is important in the original model formulation to involve both primal variables (e.g., production) as well as dual variables (e.g., market prices) for public and private sector energy planning. Traditional optimization problems can not directly handle this mixing of primal and dual variables but complementarity models can and this makes them all that more effective for decision-makers. 656 pp. Englisch.

Kartoniert / Broschiert. Condizione: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. A very readable expository approach appropriated for students, researchers and practitionersFirst book to specifically apply complementarity models to energy marketsGabriel and Conejo are two huge leaders in the.

Paperback / softback. Condizione: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days.

Condizione: New. Print on Demand pp. 656 49:B&W 6.14 x 9.21 in or 234 x 156 mm (Royal 8vo) Perfect Bound on White w/Gloss Lam.

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -This addition to the ISOR series introduces complementarity models in a straightforward and approachable manner and uses them to carry out an in-depth analysis of energy markets, including formulation issues and solution techniques. In a nutshell, complementarity models generalize: a. optimization problems via their Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions b. on-cooperative games in which each player may be solving a separate but related optimization problem with potentially overall system constraints (e.g., market-clearing conditions) c. conomic and engineering problems that aren¿t specifically derived from optimization problems (e.g., spatial price equilibria) d. roblems in which both primal and dual variables (prices) appear in the original formulation (e.g., The National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) or its precursor, PIES). As such, complementarity models are a very general and flexible modeling format. A natural question is why concentrate on energy markets for this complementarity approach s it turns out, energy or other markets that have game theoretic aspects are best modeled by complementarity problems. The reason is that the traditional perfect competition approach no longer applies due to deregulation and restructuring of these markets and thus the corresponding optimization problems may no longer hold. Also, in some instances it is important in the original model formulation to involve both primal variables (e.g., production) as well as dual variables (e.g., market prices) for public and private sector energy planning. Traditional optimization problems can not directly handle this mixing of primal and dual variables but complementarity models can and this makes them all that more effective for decision-makers.Springer-Verlag KG, Sachsenplatz 4-6, 1201 Wien 656 pp. Englisch.

Condizione: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 656.

Condizione: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. A very readable expository approach appropriated for students, researchers and practitionersFirst book to specifically apply complementarity models to energy marketsGabriel and Conejo are two huge leaders in the.

Buch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -This addition to the ISOR series introduces complementarity models in a straightforward and approachable manner and uses them to carry out an in-depth analysis of energy markets, including formulation issues and solution techniques. In a nutshell, complementarity models generalize: a. optimization problems via their Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions b. on-cooperative games in which each player may be solving a separate but related optimization problem with potentially overall system constraints (e.g., market-clearing conditions) c. conomic and engineering problems that aren't specifically derived from optimization problems (e.g., spatial price equilibria) d. roblems in which both primal and dual variables (prices) appear in the original formulation (e.g., The National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) or its precursor, PIES). As such, complementarity models are a very general and flexible modeling format. A natural question is why concentrate on energy markets for this complementarity approach s it turns out, energy or other markets that have game theoretic aspects are best modeled by complementarity problems. The reason is that the traditional perfect competition approach no longer applies due to deregulation and restructuring of these markets and thus the corresponding optimization problems may no longer hold. Also, in some instances it is important in the original model formulation to involve both primal variables (e.g., production) as well as dual variables (e.g., market prices) for public and private sector energy planning. Traditional optimization problems can not directly handle this mixing of primal and dual variables but complementarity models can and this makes them all that more effective for decision-makers. 656 pp. Englisch.

Buch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -This addition to the ISOR series introduces complementarity models in a straightforward and approachable manner and uses them to carry out an in-depth analysis of energy markets, including formulation issues and solution techniques. In a nutshell, complementarity models generalize: a. optimization problems via their Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions b. on-cooperative games in which each player may be solving a separate but related optimization problem with potentially overall system constraints (e.g., market-clearing conditions) c. conomic and engineering problems that aren¿t specifically derived from optimization problems (e.g., spatial price equilibria) d. roblems in which both primal and dual variables (prices) appear in the original formulation (e.g., The National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) or its precursor, PIES). As such, complementarity models are a very general and flexible modeling format. A natural question is why concentrate on energy markets for this complementarity approach s it turns out, energy or other markets that have game theoretic aspects are best modeled by complementarity problems. The reason is that the traditional perfect competition approach no longer applies due to deregulation and restructuring of these markets and thus the corresponding optimization problems may no longer hold. Also, in some instances it is important in the original model formulation to involve both primal variables (e.g., production) as well as dual variables (e.g., market prices) for public and private sector energy planning. Traditional optimization problems can not directly handle this mixing of primal and dual variables but complementarity models can and this makes them all that more effective for decision-makers.Springer-Verlag KG, Sachsenplatz 4-6, 1201 Wien 656 pp. Englisch.