EUR 48,59
Quantità: 2 disponibili
Aggiungi al carrelloCondizione: Neu. 165 Seiten DE-10-78 Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 378 8° 15,2 x 1,3 x 21,0 cm, Gebundene Ausgabe.
EUR 64,00
Quantità: 1 disponibili
Aggiungi al carrello8°. 165 S., Pappband (sehr gut erhalten) (=Epistemische Studien ; Bd. 17).
Da: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Regno Unito
EUR 119,00
Quantità: Più di 20 disponibili
Aggiungi al carrelloCondizione: New. In.
EUR 133,99
Quantità: Più di 20 disponibili
Aggiungi al carrelloCondizione: New.
EUR 130,75
Quantità: Più di 20 disponibili
Aggiungi al carrelloCondizione: new.
EUR 126,18
Quantità: Più di 20 disponibili
Aggiungi al carrelloCondizione: New.
EUR 141,15
Quantità: Più di 20 disponibili
Aggiungi al carrelloCondizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.
EUR 38,82
Quantità: 1 disponibili
Aggiungi al carrelloCondizione: Sehr gut. Zustand: Sehr gut | Sprache: Englisch | Produktart: Bücher | Keine Beschreibung verfügbar.
Lingua: Inglese
Editore: Walter de Gruyter, Incorporated, 2010
ISBN 10: 3110329387 ISBN 13: 9783110329384
Da: Majestic Books, Hounslow, Regno Unito
EUR 151,06
Quantità: 3 disponibili
Aggiungi al carrelloCondizione: New. pp. 165.
EUR 144,25
Quantità: Più di 20 disponibili
Aggiungi al carrelloCondizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.
EUR 152,25
Quantità: 2 disponibili
Aggiungi al carrelloHardcover. Condizione: Brand New. 165 pages. 8.27x5.83x0.71 inches. In Stock.
Lingua: Inglese
Editore: Walter de Gruyter, Incorporated, 2010
ISBN 10: 3110329387 ISBN 13: 9783110329384
Da: Books Puddle, New York, NY, U.S.A.
Condizione: New. pp. 165.
EUR 178,06
Quantità: Più di 20 disponibili
Aggiungi al carrelloHardback. Condizione: New. This book is focused on a problem that has aroused the most controversy in recent epistemological debate, which is whether the truth can or cannot be the fundamental epistemic goal. Traditional epistemology has presupposed the centrality of truth without giving a deeper analysis. To epistemic value pluralists, the claim that truth is the fundamental value seems unjustified. Their central judgement is that we can be in a situation where we do not attain truth but something else that is also epistemically valuable. In contrast, epistemic value monists are committed to the view that one can only attain something of epistemic value by attaining truth. It was necessary to rethink the long-accepted platitude that truth is our primary epistemic goal, once several objections about epistemic value were formulated. The whole debate is instructive for understanding how the epistemic value domain is structured.
EUR 136,57
Quantità: 1 disponibili
Aggiungi al carrelloBuch. Condizione: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This book is focused on a problem that has aroused the most controversy in recent epistemological debate, which is whether the truth can or cannot be the fundamental epistemic goal. Traditional epistemology has presupposed the centrality of truth without giving a deeper analysis. To epistemic value pluralists, the claim that truth is the fundamental value seems unjustified. Their central judgement is that we can be in a situation where we do not attain truth but something else that is also epistemically valuable. In contrast, epistemic value monists are committed to the view that one can only attain something of epistemic value by attaining truth. It was necessary to rethink the long-accepted platitude that truth is our primary epistemic goal, once several objections about epistemic value were formulated. The whole debate is instructive for understanding how the epistemic value domain is structured.; Die Reihe präsentiert analytisch orientierte deutsch- und englischsprachige Untersuchungen zu aktuellen Fragen der Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie.
EUR 180,38
Quantità: Più di 20 disponibili
Aggiungi al carrelloHardback. Condizione: New. This book is focused on a problem that has aroused the most controversy in recent epistemological debate, which is whether the truth can or cannot be the fundamental epistemic goal. Traditional epistemology has presupposed the centrality of truth without giving a deeper analysis. To epistemic value pluralists, the claim that truth is the fundamental value seems unjustified. Their central judgement is that we can be in a situation where we do not attain truth but something else that is also epistemically valuable. In contrast, epistemic value monists are committed to the view that one can only attain something of epistemic value by attaining truth. It was necessary to rethink the long-accepted platitude that truth is our primary epistemic goal, once several objections about epistemic value were formulated. The whole debate is instructive for understanding how the epistemic value domain is structured.
Da: Kennys Bookshop and Art Galleries Ltd., Galway, GY, Irlanda
EUR 220,63
Quantità: Più di 20 disponibili
Aggiungi al carrelloCondizione: New. 2010. Hardcover. . . . . .
EUR 235,14
Quantità: Più di 20 disponibili
Aggiungi al carrelloCondizione: New. 2010. Hardcover. . . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.
EUR 259,98
Quantità: 5 disponibili
Aggiungi al carrelloHardcover. Condizione: New.
Da: Mispah books, Redhill, SURRE, Regno Unito
EUR 292,27
Quantità: 1 disponibili
Aggiungi al carrellohardcover. Condizione: New. NEW. SHIPS FROM MULTIPLE LOCATIONS. book.
Da: moluna, Greven, Germania
EUR 93,96
Quantità: Più di 20 disponibili
Aggiungi al carrelloHardcover. Condizione: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. This book is focused on a problem that.
Lingua: Inglese
Editore: De Gruyter, De Gruyter Jan 2010, 2010
ISBN 10: 3110329387 ISBN 13: 9783110329384
Da: buchversandmimpf2000, Emtmannsberg, BAYE, Germania
EUR 104,95
Quantità: 1 disponibili
Aggiungi al carrelloBuch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -This book is focused on a problem that has aroused the most controversy in recent epistemological debate, which is whether the truth can or cannot be the fundamental epistemic goal. Traditional epistemology has presupposed the centrality of truth without giving a deeper analysis. To epistemic value pluralists, the claim that truth is the fundamental value seems unjustified. Their central judgement is that we can be in a situation where we do not attain truth but something else that is also epistemically valuable. In contrast, epistemic value monists are committed to the view that one can only attain something of epistemic value by attaining truth. It was necessary to rethink the long-accepted platitude that truth is our primary epistemic goal, once several objections about epistemic value were formulated. The whole debate is instructive for understanding how the epistemic value domain is structured.Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Genthiner Strasse 13, 10785 Berlin 172 pp. Englisch.