Jay w boggs editor (2 risultati)
- Brossura
Da: Wonder Book, Frederick, MD, U.S.A.Wonder Book
Contatta il venditoreVenditore con 5 stelleCondizione: Usato - Molto buono
EUR 11,37
Spedizione gratuitaSpedito in U.S.A.Quantità: 2 disponibili
Condizione: Very Good. Very Good condition. A copy that may have a few cosmetic defects. May also contain light spine creasing or a few markings such as an owner's name, short gifter's inscription or light stamp.
Lingua: Inglese
Editore: United States Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, 2007
- Brossura
- Prima edizione
Da: Ground Zero Books, Ltd., Silver Spring, MD, U.S.A.Ground Zero Books, Ltd.
Contatta il venditoreVenditore con 5 stelleCondizione: Usato - Buono
EUR 40,65
EUR 4,39 spedizioneSpedito in U.S.A.Quantità: 3 disponibili
Trade paperback. Condizione: Good. Presumed first edition/first printing. Glued binding. xi, [1], 605, [3] p. Contains: Illustrations, black & white. Map. Endnotes. Glossary. Bibliography. Cover has some wear and soiling. Preface by LTG Richard A. Chilcoat (U.S. Army, Retired). Joe Cerami served on the faculty of the University…of St. Thomas-Houston from 2016-2018 as the Burnett Family Distinguished Chair in Leadership, the Director of the Center for Ethical Leadership, and Associate Professor of Management. Prior to coming to UST, Dr. Cerami taught graduate level courses in national security policy and leadership studies in the Master's Program in International Affairs, and as Founding Director of the Public Service Leadership Program, at the Bush School of Government, at Texas A&M University, from 2001-2015. During a 30-year Army career Colonel Cerami served in Germany and the Republic of Korea as a strategist, military plans and operations officer, and in Field Artillery assignments. He taught political science and international affairs at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York. Colonel Cerami's last military assignment was as the Chair of the Department of National Security and Strategy at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. He holds a doctorate from the Penn State School of Public Affairs, an MA in Government from the University of Texas at Austin, a BS in Engineering from West Point, and a Certificate from the Harvard Kennedy School Program for Senior Officials in National Security Affairs. For decades since the formation of the defense establishment under the 1947 National Security Act, all U.S. cabinet departments, national security agencies, and military services involved in providing for the common defense have struggled to overcome differences in policy and strategy formulation, organizational cultures, and even basic terminology. Post-September 11, 2001, international systems, security environments, U.S. military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the greater Global War on Terrorism have confronted civilian policymakers and senior military officers with a complex, fluid battlefield which demands kinetic and counterinsurgency capabilities. This monograph addresses the security, stability, transition, and reconstruction missions that place the most pressure on interagency communication and coordination. The results from Kabul to Baghdad reveal that the interagency process is in need of reform and that a more robust effort to integrate and align civilian and military elements is a prerequisite for success. According to the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide (2009) counter-insurgency or counterinsurgency. (COIN) "may be defined as comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes ". "Insurgency is the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify or challenge political control of a region. As such, it is primarily a political struggle, in which both sides use armed force to create space for their political, economic and influence activities to be effective." Counter-insurgency campaigns of duly-elected or politically recognized governments take place during war, occupation by a foreign military or police force, and when internal conflicts that involve subversion and armed rebellion occur. The best counterinsurgency campaigns "integrate and synchronize political, security, economic, and informational components that reinforce governmental legitimacy and effectiveness while reducing insurgent influence over the population. COIN strategies should be designed to simultaneously protect the population from insurgent violence; strengthen the legitimacy and capacity of government institutions to govern responsibly and marginalize insurgents politically, socially, and economically. (U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide, 2009).
