Kordig c r (24 risultati)

Paperback. Condizione: Very Good. No Jacket. May have limited writing in cover pages. Pages are unmarked. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less.

gebundene Ausgabe. Condizione: Gut. 119 Seiten Das hier angebotene Buch stammt aus einer teilaufgelösten Bibliothek und kann die entsprechenden Kennzeichnungen aufweisen (Rückenschild, Instituts-Stempel.); der Buchzustand ist ansonsten ordentlich und dem Alter entsprechend gut. In ENGLISCHER Sprache. Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 340.…

Condizione: Good. This is an ex-library book and may have the usual library/used-book markings inside.This book has hardback covers. In good all round condition. No dust jacket. Please note the Image in this listing is a stock photo and may not match the covers of the actual item,450grams, ISBN:9027701814. …

Condizione: Fair. This is an ex-library book and may have the usual library/used-book markings inside.This book has hardback covers. Book contains pencil markings. In fair condition, suitable as a study copy. Please note the Image in this listing is a stock photo and may not match the covers of the actual item,400grams, ISBN:9027701814.…

Condizione: New.

Condizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condizione: New. In English.

Condizione: New. In English.

Condizione: New.

Condizione: New.

Condizione: New. pp. 140.

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - In this book I discuss the justification of scientific change and argue that it rests on different sorts of invariance. Against this background I con sider notions of observation, meaning, and regulative standards. My position is in opposition to some widely influential and current views. Revolutionary new ideas concerning the philosophy of science have recently been advanced by Feyerabend, Hanson, Kuhn, Toulmin, and others. There are differences among their views and each in some respect differs from the others. It is, however, not the differences, but rather the similarities that are of primary concern to me here. The claim that there are pervasive presuppositions fundamental to scientific in vestigations seems to be essential to the views of these men. Each would further hold that transitions from one scientific tradition to another force radical changes in what is observed, in the meanings of the terms employed, and in the metastandards involved. They would claim that total replace ment, not reduction, is what does, and should, occur during scientific revolutions. I argue that the proposed arguments for radical observational variance, for radical meaning variance, and for radical variance of regulative standards with respect to scientific transitions all fail. I further argue that these positions are in themselves implausible and methodologically undesirable. I sketch an account of the rationale of scientific change which preserves the merits and avoids the shortcomings of the approach of radical meaning variance theorists.…

Condizione: New. pp. 140.

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. The Justification of Scientific Change | C. R. Kordig | Taschenbuch | xiv | Englisch | Springer | EAN 9789027704757 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu. …

Condizione: New.

Buch. Condizione: Neu. Neuware - In this book I discuss the justification of scientific change and argue that it rests on different sorts of invariance. Against this background I con sider notions of observation, meaning, and regulative standards. My position is in opposition to some widely influential and current views. Revolutionary new ideas concerning the philosophy of science have recently been advanced by Feyerabend, Hanson, Kuhn, Toulmin, and others. There are differences among their views and each in some respect differs from the others. It is, however, not the differences, but rather the similarities that are of primary concern to me here. The claim that there are pervasive presuppositions fundamental to scientific in vestigations seems to be essential to the views of these men. Each would further hold that transitions from one scientific tradition to another force radical changes in what is observed, in the meanings of the terms employed, and in the metastandards involved. They would claim that total replace ment, not reduction, is what does, and should, occur during scientific revolutions. I argue that the proposed arguments for radical observational variance, for radical meaning variance, and for radical variance of regulative standards with respect to scientific transitions all fail. I further argue that these positions are in themselves implausible and methodologically undesirable. I sketch an account of the rationale of scientific change which preserves the merits and avoids the shortcomings of the approach of radical meaning variance theorists.…

Dordrecht 1971. xiv,119 pp. Ocl. (Synth.Libr., binding a bit spotted).

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -In this book I discuss the justification of scientific change and argue that it rests on different sorts of invariance. Against this background I con sider notions of observation, meaning, and regulative standards. My position is in opposition to some widely influential and current views. Revolutionary new ideas concerning the philosophy of science have recently been advanced by Feyerabend, Hanson, Kuhn, Toulmin, and others. There are differences among their views and each in some respect differs from the others. It is, however, not the differences, but rather the similarities that are of primary concern to me here. The claim that there are pervasive presuppositions fundamental to scientific in vestigations seems to be essential to the views of these men. Each would further hold that transitions from one scientific tradition to another force radical changes in what is observed, in the meanings of the terms employed, and in the metastandards involved. They would claim that total replace ment, not reduction, is what does, and should, occur during scientific revolutions. I argue that the proposed arguments for radical observational variance, for radical meaning variance, and for radical variance of regulative standards with respect to scientific transitions all fail. I further argue that these positions are in themselves implausible and methodologically undesirable. I sketch an account of the rationale of scientific change which preserves the merits and avoids the shortcomings of the approach of radical meaning variance theorists. 140 pp. Englisch.…

Condizione: New. Print on Demand pp. 140 49:B&W 6.14 x 9.21 in or 234 x 156 mm (Royal 8vo) Perfect Bound on White w/Gloss Lam.

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -In this book I discuss the justification of scientific change and argue that it rests on different sorts of invariance. Against this background I con sider notions of observation, meaning, and regulative standards. My position is in opposition to some widely influential and current views. Revolutionary new ideas concerning the philosophy of science have recently been advanced by Feyerabend, Hanson, Kuhn, Toulmin, and others. There are differences among their views and each in some respect differs from the others. It is, however, not the differences, but rather the similarities that are of primary concern to me here. The claim that there are pervasive presuppositions fundamental to scientific in vestigations seems to be essential to the views of these men. Each would further hold that transitions from one scientific tradition to another force radical changes in what is observed, in the meanings of the terms employed, and in the metastandards involved. They would claim that total replace ment, not reduction, is what does, and should, occur during scientific revolutions. I argue that the proposed arguments for radical observational variance, for radical meaning variance, and for radical variance of regulative standards with respect to scientific transitions all fail. I further argue that these positions are in themselves implausible and methodologically undesirable. I sketch an account of the rationale of scientific change which preserves the merits and avoids the shortcomings of the approach of radical meaning variance theorists.Springer-Verlag KG, Sachsenplatz 4-6, 1201 Wien 140 pp. Englisch.…

Condizione: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 140.

Condizione: New. Print on Demand pp. 140 52:B&W 6.14 x 9.21in or 234 x 156mm (Royal 8vo) Case Laminate on White w/Gloss Lam.

Condizione: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 140.