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Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Neuware - If there is one standpoint which unites contemporary moral philosophers of every persuasion it is a rejection of Kant's unequivocal precept 'Thou shalt not lie' in the Preface to the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, the work which marks the beginning of his mature ethical philosophy. Here and elsewhere Kant defines a lie as an intentionally untruthful declaration and argues that utterances of this kind are shown by the categorical imperative to be immoral because a maxim of lying cannot also be willed as a universal law valid for all human beings. The standard objection to an unrestricted prohibition of lying is, of course, that it leaves a person defenceless in the face of wrong-doing and renders them as Korsgaard (1986) puts it, a 'tool of evil'. Damning indictments of this kind have been repeated endlessly since the publication of the Groundwork in 1785 and continue in recent commentaries even by those who in other respects find some value in Kant's Critical Philosophy. In Kant. A Revolution in Thinking (2025), for example, Willaschek maintains that Kant misapplies the categorical imperative and this leads him to the mistaken belief that lying in all circumstances and for any reason is immoral. So Willaschek proclaims: 'To put a friend to the sword just in order to save oneself from having to lie is not a moral imperative but despicable and cowardly.' And in a similar fashion Timmermann maintains in Kant and the Supposed Right to Lie (2025): 'The fact remains that Kant did declare truthfulness to be more important than the life of a friend, both from the standpoint of formal juridical duty and from the point of view of ethics; and anyone interested in his moral philosophy would do well to take this position seriously.'.…

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Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. If there is one standpoint which unites contemporary moral philosophers of every persuasion it is a rejection of Kant's unequivocal precept "Thou shalt not lie" in the Preface to the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, the work which marks the beginning of his mature ethical philosophy. Here and elsewhere Kant defines a lie as an intentionally untruthful declaration and argues that utterances of this kind are shown by the categorical imperative to be immoral because a maxim of lying cannot also be willed as a universal law valid for all human beings. The standard objection to an unrestricted prohibition of lying is, of course, that it leaves a person defenceless in the face of wrong-doing and renders them as Korsgaard (1986) puts it, a "tool of evil". Damning indictments of this kind have been repeated endlessly since the publication of the Groundwork in 1785 and continue in recent commentaries even by those who in other respects find some value in Kant's Critical Philosophy. In Kant. A Revolution in Thinking (2025), for example, Willaschek maintains that Kant misapplies the categorical imperative and this leads him to the mistaken belief that lying in all circumstances and for any reason is immoral. So Willaschek proclaims: "To put a friend to the sword just in order to save oneself from having to lie is not a moral imperative but despicable and cowardly." And in a similar fashion Timmermann maintains in Kant and the Supposed Right to Lie (2025): "The fact remains that Kant did declare truthfulness to be more important than the life of a friend, both from the standpoint of formal juridical duty and from the point of view of ethics; and anyone interested in his moral philosophy would do well to take this position seriously." This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.…

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Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. If there is one standpoint which unites contemporary moral philosophers of every persuasion it is a rejection of Kant's unequivocal precept "Thou shalt not lie" in the Preface to the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, the work which marks the beginning of his mature ethical philosophy. Here and elsewhere Kant defines a lie as an intentionally untruthful declaration and argues that utterances of this kind are shown by the categorical imperative to be immoral because a maxim of lying cannot also be willed as a universal law valid for all human beings. The standard objection to an unrestricted prohibition of lying is, of course, that it leaves a person defenceless in the face of wrong-doing and renders them as Korsgaard (1986) puts it, a "tool of evil". Damning indictments of this kind have been repeated endlessly since the publication of the Groundwork in 1785 and continue in recent commentaries even by those who in other respects find some value in Kant's Critical Philosophy. In Kant. A Revolution in Thinking (2025), for example, Willaschek maintains that Kant misapplies the categorical imperative and this leads him to the mistaken belief that lying in all circumstances and for any reason is immoral. So Willaschek proclaims: "To put a friend to the sword just in order to save oneself from having to lie is not a moral imperative but despicable and cowardly." And in a similar fashion Timmermann maintains in Kant and the Supposed Right to Lie (2025): "The fact remains that Kant did declare truthfulness to be more important than the life of a friend, both from the standpoint of formal juridical duty and from the point of view of ethics; and anyone interested in his moral philosophy would do well to take this position seriously." This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.…

Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. If there is one standpoint which unites contemporary moral philosophers of every persuasion it is a rejection of Kant's unequivocal precept "Thou shalt not lie" in the Preface to the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, the work which marks the beginning of his mature ethical philosophy. Here and elsewhere Kant defines a lie as an intentionally untruthful declaration and argues that utterances of this kind are shown by the categorical imperative to be immoral because a maxim of lying cannot also be willed as a universal law valid for all human beings. The standard objection to an unrestricted prohibition of lying is, of course, that it leaves a person defenceless in the face of wrong-doing and renders them as Korsgaard (1986) puts it, a "tool of evil". Damning indictments of this kind have been repeated endlessly since the publication of the Groundwork in 1785 and continue in recent commentaries even by those who in other respects find some value in Kant's Critical Philosophy. In Kant. A Revolution in Thinking (2025), for example, Willaschek maintains that Kant misapplies the categorical imperative and this leads him to the mistaken belief that lying in all circumstances and for any reason is immoral. So Willaschek proclaims: "To put a friend to the sword just in order to save oneself from having to lie is not a moral imperative but despicable and cowardly." And in a similar fashion Timmermann maintains in Kant and the Supposed Right to Lie (2025): "The fact remains that Kant did declare truthfulness to be more important than the life of a friend, both from the standpoint of formal juridical duty and from the point of view of ethics; and anyone interested in his moral philosophy would do well to take this position seriously." This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.…

Kartoniert / Broschiert. Condizione: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. KlappentextrnrnFew aspects of Kant s political philosophy have attracted more censure than his views on revolution and the two common charges are examined here: it is said that since in general Kant opposes revolution but welcomes the French Rev. …

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - Few aspects of Kant's political philosophy have attracted more censure than his views on revolution and the two common charges are examined here: it is said that since in general Kant opposes revolution but welcomes the French Revolution his standpoint is confused and contradictory, and further that his main argument against revolution renders the citizen helpless in the face of state violence. Are these charges justified Drawing on neglected elements of Kant's ethical works from1784 to 1798, and highlighting his defence of inalienable human rights as well as his particular interpretation of events in France in May and June of 1789, this original analysis raises serious questions not only about the standard criticism but also the general manner in which Kant's practical philosophy has so often been approached in the scholarly literature.…

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Kant and Revolution | Lenval A Callender | Taschenbuch | Kartoniert / Broschiert | Englisch | 2011 | abramis | EAN 9781845494698 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, 36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr[at]libri[dot]de | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand.