millikan ruth garrett (174 risultati)

Hardcover. Condizione: Fair. 0. The item might be beaten up but readable. May contain markings or highlighting, as well as stains, bent corners, or any other major defect, but the text is not obscured in any way.

Soft cover. Condizione: Very Good.

Paperback. Condizione: Very Good. Book has light rubbing to the cover. Hinges and corners showing light shelf wear. Otherwise an attractive copy. Tight binding, unmarked crisp pages, no stains or tears.

Hard Cover. Condizione: Good +. Condizione sovraccoperta: Very Good. 387pp. Blue cloth hardback with DJ, VG, index, references, appendices, footnotes, c.60pp. have pencil marks, red ink or yellow highlighting, essays, Millikan clarifies her views on the nature of mental representation, explores whether human thought is a product of natural selection, examines the nature of behavior as studied by the behavioral sciences, and discusses the issues of individualism in psychology, psychological explanation, indexicality in thought, what knowledge is, and the realism/antirealism debate,

paperback. Condizione: Good. Modest shelfwear to cover, clean pages and sound binding.

Paper Back. Condizione: Very Good.

Condizione: New.

Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. Ruth Garrett Millikan presents a highly original account of cognition - of how we get to grips with the world in thought. The question at the heart of her book is Kant's 'How is knowledge possible?', but answered from a contemporary naturalist standpoint. The starting assumption is that we are evolved creatures that use cognition as a guide in dealing with the natural world, and that the natural world is roughly as natural science has tried to describe it. Veryunlike Kant, then, we must begin with ontology, with a rough understanding of what the world is like prior to cognition, only later developing theories about the nature of cognition within that world andhow it manages to reflect the rest of nature. And in trying to get from ontology to cognition we must traverse another non-Kantian domain: questions about the transmission of information both through natural signs and through purposeful signs including, especially, language.Millikan makes a number of innovations. Central to the book is her introduction of the ideas of unitrackers and unicepts, whose job is to recognize the same again as manifested through the jargon ofexperience. She offers a direct reference theory for common nouns and other extensional terms; a naturalist sketch of conceptual development; a theory of natural information and of language function thatshows how properly functioning language carries natural information; a novel description of the semantics/pragmatics distinction; a discussion of perception as translation from natural informational signs; new descriptions of indexicals, demonstratives and intensional contexts; and a new analysis of the reference of incomplete descriptions. Ruth Garrett Millikan presents a strikingly original account of how we get to grips with the world in thought. Her question is Kant's 'How is knowledge possible?', answered from a contemporary naturalist standpoint. We begin with an understanding of what the world is like prior to cognition, then develop a theory of cognition within that world. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Paperback. Condizione: Very Good. The book has been read, but is in excellent condition. Pages are intact and not marred by notes or highlighting. The spine remains undamaged.

Paperback. Condizione: Very Good. Pages unmarked & clean; firmly in blue wraps. Philosophy; Journal; 8vo - over 7¾" - 9¾" tall.

Condizione: New. Brand New.

Paperback. Condizione: Near Fine. Paperback edition. Remainder mark on bottom edge, else fine in illustrated wraps. Still in original shrinkwrap.

Paperback. Condizione: New. Ruth Garrett Millikan presents a highly original account of cognition - of how we get to grips with the world in thought. The question at the heart of her book is Kant's 'How is knowledge possible?', but answered from a contemporary naturalist standpoint. The starting assumption is that we are evolved creatures that use cognition as a guide in dealing with the natural world, and that the natural world is roughly as natural science has tried to describe it. Very unlike Kant, then, we must begin with ontology, with a rough understanding of what the world is like prior to cognition, only later developing theories about the nature of cognition within that world and how it manages to reflect the rest of nature. And in trying to get from ontology to cognition we must traverse another non-Kantian domain: questions about the transmission of information both through natural signs and through purposeful signs including, especially, language. Millikan makes a number of innovations. Central to the book is her introduction of the ideas of unitrackers and unicepts, whose job is to recognize the same again as manifested through the jargon of experience. She offers a direct reference theory for common nouns and other extensional terms; a naturalist sketch of conceptual development; a theory of natural information and of language function that shows how properly functioning language carries natural information; a novel description of the semantics/pragmatics distinction; a discussion of perception as translation from natural informational signs; new descriptions of indexicals, demonstratives and intensional contexts; and a new analysis of the reference of incomplete descriptions.

Condizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Soft cover. Condizione: Near Fine. No marks. Light shelfwear.

Paperback. Condizione: Good. Connecting readers with great books since 1972! Used textbooks may not include companion materials such as access codes, etc. May have some wear or writing/highlighting. We ship orders daily and Customer Service is our top priority!

Trade Paperback. Condizione: Very Good. 2nd printing. small remainder mark foot. stamp on fly. unmarked, solid, clean.

Condizione: New. In.

Condizione: New.

Condizione: New.

Condizione: Fair. This is an ex-library book and may have the usual library/used-book markings inside.This book has hardback covers. In fair condition, suitable as a study copy. Dust jacket in good condition. Please note the Image in this listing is a stock photo and may not match the covers of the actual item,600grams, ISBN:9780262134446.

Condizione: New.

Condizione: NUOVO. Pisa, ETS cm.14x21, pp.314, brossura con cop.fig. L'opera prende in esame i concetti basilari per la nostra esperienza del mondo, quelli di sostanza: come sono acquisiti, come funzionano e come sono stati fraintesi nella letteratura filosofica e psicologica. Con un radicale distacco dalle teorie correnti sulla natura dei concetti, la tesi centrale di Ruth Garret Millikan - una delle figure più creative e innovative dell'attuale panorama filosofico nordamericano - è che i concetti di sostanza non sono modi di classificare, ma abilità complesse a identificare e reidentificare cose con le quali organismi umani, e non umani, si trovano ad interagire nel mondo. È un libro di interesse per studenti e ricercatori nell'ambito della filosofia, della psicologia e delle scienze cognitive. A cura di Carlo Marletti. Traduzione di Vanni Zavarelli.

Soft cover. Condizione: Very Good. Very Good++ or Near Fine- trade paperback, a clean copy.

Condizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Paperback. Condizione: New.

Condizione: New.

24 x 16 cm. Condizione: Gut. 3. impression. VIII, 240 Seiten Innen sehr sauberer, sehr guter Zustand. Leineneinband mit Schutzumschlag, mit den üblichen Bibliotheks-Markierungen, Stempeln und Einträgen, innen wie außen, siehe Bilder. Sehr gutes Bibliotheksexemplar. B07-22-06X Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 544.

Paperback. Condizione: New. Guiding the work of most linguists and philosophers of language today is the assumption that language is governed by prescriptive normative rules. Many believe that it is of the essence of thought itself to follow rules, rules of inference determining the intentional contents of our concepts, and that these rules originate as internalized rules of language. However, exactly what it is for there to be such things as normative rules of language remains distressingly unclear. From what source do these norms flow? What sanctions enforce them? What happens, exactly, if you don't follow the rules? How do children learn the rules?Ruth Millikan presents a radicallly different way of viewing the partial regularities that language displays, the norms and conventions of language. The central norms applying to language, like those norms of function and behavior that account for the survival and proliferation of biological traits, are non-evaluative norms. Specific linguistic forms survive and are reproduced together with co-operative hearer responses because, in a critical mass of cases, these patterns of production and response benefit both speakers and hearers. Conformity is needed only often enough to ensure that the co-operative use constituting the norm - the convention - continues to be copied and hence continues to characterize some interactions of some speaker-hearer pairs.What needs to be reproduced for discursive language forms to survive, it turns out, is not specific conceptual roles but only satisfaction conditions coupled to essential elements of hearer responses. An uncompromising rejection of conceptual analysis as a tool in philosophy results. At the same time the distinction between the propositional content and the force of a linguistic utterance comes into very sharp focus, force emerging as essential to the creation of content rather than as something added to content. The distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary force, the distinction between linguistic meaning and speaker meaning, and the semantics/pragmatics distinction are each illuminated in new and crisper ways. On the model proposed, neither the intentionality of thought nor the intentionality of language is derived from the other. Processes involved in understanding language are not Gricean but more like direct perception of the world as mediated, for example, through the natural signs contained in the structured light that allows vision. There are also startling implications for pragmatics, and for how children learn language.