rimell nicholas (28 risultati)

24 x 17 cm. Condizione: Gut. 243 Seiten Innen sauberer, guter Zustand. Softcover, Broschur mit den üblichen Bibliotheks-Markierungen, Stempeln und Einträgen, innen wie außen, siehe Bilder. (Evtl. auch Kleber- und/oder Etikettenreste, sowie -abdrücke durch abgelöste Bibliotheksschilder). Einband sehr gut erhalten. In Englisch B14-02-06H|S42 Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 1.

Condizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condizione: New. In.

Condizione: New.

Condizione: New.

Condizione: New. 1st ed. 2021 edition NO-PA16APR2015-KAP.

Condizione: New.

Paperback. Condizione: Brand New. 228 pages. 8.27x5.83x0.53 inches. In Stock.

Condizione: New. In.

Condizione: New.

Condizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Representational Content and the Objects of Thought | Nicholas Rimell | Taschenbuch | xiii | Englisch | 2022 | Springer | EAN 9789811635199 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu.

Condizione: New. 2021. Hardcover. . . . . .

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This book defends a novel view of mental representation-of how, as thinkers, we represent the world as being. The book serves as a response to two problems in the philosophy of mind. One is the problem of first-personal, or egocentric, belief: how can we have truly first personal beliefs-beliefs in which we think about ourselves as ourselves-given that beliefs are supposed to be attitudes towards propositions and that propositions are supposed to have their truth values independent of a perspective The other problem is how we can think about nonexistents (e.g., Santa Claus) given the widespread view that thought essentially involves a relation between a thinker and whatever is being thought about. The standard responses to this puzzle are either to deny that thought is essentially relational or to insist that it is possible to stand in relations to nonexistents. This book offers an error theory to the problem.The responses from this book arise from thesame commitment: a commitment to treating talk of propositions-as the things towards which our beliefs are attitudes-as talk of entities that actually exist and that play a constitutive and explanatory role in the activity of thought.

Condizione: New. 1st ed. 2021 edition NO-PA16APR2015-KAP.

Hardcover. Condizione: Brand New. 228 pages. 8.27x5.83x0.71 inches. In Stock.

Condizione: New. 2021. Hardcover. . . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Buch. Condizione: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This book defends a novel view of mental representation-of how, as thinkers, we represent the world as being. The book serves as a response to two problems in the philosophy of mind. One is the problem of first-personal, or egocentric, belief: how can we have truly first personal beliefs-beliefs in which we think about ourselves as ourselves-given that beliefs are supposed to be attitudes towards propositions and that propositions are supposed to have their truth values independent of a perspective The other problem is how we can think about nonexistents (e.g., Santa Claus) given the widespread view that thought essentially involves a relation between a thinker and whatever is being thought about. The standard responses to this puzzle are either to deny that thought is essentially relational or to insist that it is possible to stand in relations to nonexistents. This book offers an error theory to the problem.The responses from this book arise from thesame commitment: a commitment to treating talk of propositions-as the things towards which our beliefs are attitudes-as talk of entities that actually exist and that play a constitutive and explanatory role in the activity of thought.

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -This book defends a novel view of mental representation-of how, as thinkers, we represent the world as being. The book serves as a response to two problems in the philosophy of mind. One is the problem of first-personal, or egocentric, belief: how can we have truly first personal beliefs-beliefs in which we think about ourselves as ourselves-given that beliefs are supposed to be attitudes towards propositions and that propositions are supposed to have their truth values independent of a perspective The other problem is how we can think about nonexistents (e.g., Santa Claus) given the widespread view that thought essentially involves a relation between a thinker and whatever is being thought about. The standard responses to this puzzle are either to deny that thought is essentially relational or to insist that it is possible to stand in relations to nonexistents. This book offers an error theory to the problem.The responses from this book arise from the same commitment: a commitment to treating talk of propositions-as the things towards which our beliefs are attitudes-as talk of entities that actually exist and that play a constitutive and explanatory role in the activity of thought. 232 pp. Englisch.

Condizione: New. Print on Demand.

Condizione: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. This book defends a novel view of mental representation-of how, as thinkers, we represent the world as being. The book serves as a response to two problems in the philosophy of mind. One is the problem of first-personal, or egocentric, belief: how can we.

Condizione: New. PRINT ON DEMAND.

Buch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -This book defends a novel view of mental representation-of how, as thinkers, we represent the world as being. The book serves as a response to two problems in the philosophy of mind. One is the problem of first-personal, or egocentric, belief: how can we have truly first personal beliefs-beliefs in which we think about ourselves as ourselves-given that beliefs are supposed to be attitudes towards propositions and that propositions are supposed to have their truth values independent of a perspective The other problem is how we can think about nonexistents (e.g., Santa Claus) given the widespread view that thought essentially involves a relation between a thinker and whatever is being thought about. The standard responses to this puzzle are either to deny that thought is essentially relational or to insist that it is possible to stand in relations to nonexistents. This book offers an error theory to the problem.The responses from this book arise from the same commitment: a commitment to treating talk of propositions-as the things towards which our beliefs are attitudes-as talk of entities that actually exist and that play a constitutive and explanatory role in the activity of thought. 232 pp. Englisch.

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -This book defends a novel view of mental representation-of how, as thinkers, we represent the world as being. The book serves as a response to two problems in the philosophy of mind. One is the problem of first-personal, or egocentric, belief: how can we have truly first personal beliefs-beliefs in which we think about ourselves as ourselves-given that beliefs are supposed to be attitudes towards propositions and that propositions are supposed to have their truth values independent of a perspective The other problem is how we can think about nonexistents (e.g., Santa Claus) given the widespread view that thought essentially involves a relation between a thinker and whatever is being thought about. The standard responses to this puzzle are either to deny that thought is essentially relational or to insist that it is possible to stand in relations to nonexistents. This book offers an error theory to the problem.The responses from this book arise from thesame commitment: a commitment to treating talk of propositions-as the things towards which our beliefs are attitudes-as talk of entities that actually exist and that play a constitutive and explanatory role in the activity of thought.Springer-Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg 232 pp. Englisch.

Condizione: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. This book defends a novel view of mental representation-of how, as thinkers, we represent the world as being. The other problem is how we can think about nonexistents (e.g., Santa Claus) given the widespread view that thought essentially involves a relatio.

Condizione: New. Print on Demand.

Condizione: New. PRINT ON DEMAND.

Buch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -This book defends a novel view of mental representation-of how, as thinkers, we represent the world as being. The book serves as a response to two problems in the philosophy of mind. One is the problem of first-personal, or egocentric, belief: how can we have truly first personal beliefs-beliefs in which we think about ourselves as ourselves-given that beliefs are supposed to be attitudes towards propositions and that propositions are supposed to have their truth values independent of a perspective The other problem is how we can think about nonexistents (e.g., Santa Claus) given the widespread view that thought essentially involves a relation between a thinker and whatever is being thought about. The standard responses to this puzzle are either to deny that thought is essentially relational or to insist that it is possible to stand in relations to nonexistents. This book offers an error theory to the problem.The responses from this book arise from thesame commitment: a commitment to treating talk of propositions-as the things towards which our beliefs are attitudes-as talk of entities that actually exist and that play a constitutive and explanatory role in the activity of thought.Springer-Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg 232 pp. Englisch.