snedegar (35 risultati)

Soft cover. Condizione: GOOD+. Interior Artists: Ken Riley; Dick Pahl; John Berkey (illustratore). ARGOSY Men Adventure Magazine Volume 364, #4 (April /1967; Popular Publications;) Painted Front Cover : Norman Adams 134 pages including covers; Writers: Brett Halliday; Martin Deutsch; Lew Louderback; Robert Joseph Allen; Peter Michelmore; David Ash; Gil Paust; Lord Kilbracken; Lowell Thomas; C. S. Forester; S. K. Snedegar; Milt Machlin; Jack Fields; Harry Steeger; Eric Nyborg; Gene Lowall; Hal Steeger; Bruce Cassiday; George Laycock; J. Edward Schipper; Interior Artists: Ken Riley; Dick Pahl; John Berkey; *** Book Order # ADV166-2; >> Dust shadow along 3 edges of forn tocver; mailing label to frotn cover; Size: 4to - over 9¾" - 12" tall TRUE FIRST Edition MAGAZINE Format Thus. Book.

Condizione: New.

Hardback. Condizione: New. Justin Snedegar develops and defends contrastivism about reasons. This is the view that normative reasons are fundamentally reasons for or against actions or attitudes only relative to sets of alternatives. Simply put, reasons are always reasons to do one thing rather than another, instead of simply being reasons to do something, full stop. Work on reasons has become central to several areas of philosophy, but besides a couple of exceptions, this view has not been discussed. Contrastive Reasons makes the case that this is a mistake. Snedegar develops three kinds of arguments for contrastivism. First, contrastivism gives us the best account of our ordinary discourse about reasons. Second, contrastivism best makes sense of widespread ideas about what reasons are, including the idea that they favor the things they are reasons for and the idea that they involve the promotion of certain kinds of objectives. Third, contrastivism has attractive applications in different areas of normative philosophy in which reasons are important. These include debates in normative ethics about whether better than might be intransitive and debates in both epistemology and practical reasoning about the rationality of withholding or suspending belief and intention.

Condizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condizione: New. In.

Condizione: New.

Hardcover. Condizione: new. Hardcover. Justin Snedegar develops and defends contrastivism about reasons. This is the view that normative reasons are fundamentally reasons for or against actions or attitudes only relative to sets of alternatives. Simply put, reasons are always reasons to do one thing rather than another, instead of simply being reasons to do something, full stop. Work on reasons has become central to several areas of philosophy, but besides a couple of exceptions, this view has not beendiscussed. Contrastive Reasons makes the case that this is a mistake. Snedegar develops three kinds of arguments for contrastivism. First, contrastivism gives us the best accountof our ordinary discourse about reasons. Second, contrastivism best makes sense of widespread ideas about what reasons are, including the idea that they favor the things they are reasons for and the idea that they involve the promotion of certain kinds of objectives. Third, contrastivism has attractive applications in different areas of normative philosophy in which reasons are important. These include debates in normative ethics about whether better than might be intransitive and debates inboth epistemology and practical reasoning about the rationality of withholding or suspending belief and intention. Justin Snedegar develops and defends contrastivism about reasons. This is the view that normative reasons are fundamentally reasons for or against actions or attitudes only relative to sets of alternatives. Simply put, reasons are always reasons to do one thing rather than another, instead of simply being reasons to do something, full stop. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Condizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condizione: New. Justin Snedegar develops and defends contrastivism about reasons. This is the view that normative reasons are fundamentally reasons for or against actions or attitudes only relative to sets of alternatives. Simply put, reasons are always reasons to do one thing rather than another, instead of simply being reasons to do something, full stop. Num Pages: 176 pages. BIC Classification: HPK; HPQ. Category: (G) General (US: Trade). Dimension: 216 x 135. . . 2017. hardcover. . . . .

Condizione: New.

Hardcover. Condizione: Brand New. 149 pages. 8.75x5.75x0.75 inches. In Stock.

Condizione: New. In.

Condizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Hardcover. Condizione: Very Good. No Jacket. First Edition. Signed and inscribed by the author Keith Snedegar. Publication of 189 pages. The Pictorial boards are in near fine condition. Internally the pages are clean and complete. The text is legible. The binding is excellent. GK. Our orders are shipped using tracked courier delivery services. Signed.

Condizione: New.

Condizione: New. Justin Snedegar develops and defends contrastivism about reasons. This is the view that normative reasons are fundamentally reasons for or against actions or attitudes only relative to sets of alternatives. Simply put, reasons are always reasons to do one thing rather than another, instead of simply being reasons to do something, full stop. Num Pages: 176 pages. BIC Classification: HPK; HPQ. Category: (G) General (US: Trade). Dimension: 216 x 135. . . 2017. hardcover. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Condizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Hardback. Condizione: New. Justin Snedegar develops and defends contrastivism about reasons. This is the view that normative reasons are fundamentally reasons for or against actions or attitudes only relative to sets of alternatives. Simply put, reasons are always reasons to do one thing rather than another, instead of simply being reasons to do something, full stop. Work on reasons has become central to several areas of philosophy, but besides a couple of exceptions, this view has not been discussed. Contrastive Reasons makes the case that this is a mistake. Snedegar develops three kinds of arguments for contrastivism. First, contrastivism gives us the best account of our ordinary discourse about reasons. Second, contrastivism best makes sense of widespread ideas about what reasons are, including the idea that they favor the things they are reasons for and the idea that they involve the promotion of certain kinds of objectives. Third, contrastivism has attractive applications in different areas of normative philosophy in which reasons are important. These include debates in normative ethics about whether better than might be intransitive and debates in both epistemology and practical reasoning about the rationality of withholding or suspending belief and intention.

Hardcover. Condizione: Brand New. 189 pages. 9.50x6.25x0.75 inches. In Stock.

HRD. Condizione: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

HRD. Condizione: New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

Condizione: new. Questo è un articolo print on demand.

Hardback. Condizione: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days.

Condizione: New. Print on Demand pp. 160.

Condizione: New. Print on Demand pp. 160.

Condizione: New. PRINT ON DEMAND pp. 160.

HRD. Condizione: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

Hardcover. Condizione: new. Hardcover. Justin Snedegar develops and defends contrastivism about reasons. This is the view that normative reasons are fundamentally reasons for or against actions or attitudes only relative to sets of alternatives. Simply put, reasons are always reasons to do one thing rather than another, instead of simply being reasons to do something, full stop. Work on reasons has become central to several areas of philosophy, but besides a couple of exceptions, this view has not beendiscussed. Contrastive Reasons makes the case that this is a mistake. Snedegar develops three kinds of arguments for contrastivism. First, contrastivism gives us the best accountof our ordinary discourse about reasons. Second, contrastivism best makes sense of widespread ideas about what reasons are, including the idea that they favor the things they are reasons for and the idea that they involve the promotion of certain kinds of objectives. Third, contrastivism has attractive applications in different areas of normative philosophy in which reasons are important. These include debates in normative ethics about whether better than might be intransitive and debates inboth epistemology and practical reasoning about the rationality of withholding or suspending belief and intention. Justin Snedegar develops and defends contrastivism about reasons. This is the view that normative reasons are fundamentally reasons for or against actions or attitudes only relative to sets of alternatives. Simply put, reasons are always reasons to do one thing rather than another, instead of simply being reasons to do something, full stop. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

HRD. Condizione: New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

Hardcover. Condizione: new. Hardcover. This is a biographical study of Alexander William Roberts, a Free Church of Scotland missionary educator who in 1883 was posted to the Lovedale Institution at Alice, South Africa. Inspired by the night sky of the southern hemisphere, Roberts became a leading observer of variable stars and an early contributor to the theory of close interacting binary stars. He actively promoted the development of colonial scientific culture and was elected president of the South African Association for the Advancement of Science in 1913. His teaching career at Lovedale fostered a commitment to the interests of his African students and their communities. In 1920 Roberts was appointed to the South African senate to represent native Africans; he also served as senior member of the Native Affairs Commission. Despite his liberal instincts he acquiesced to the movement toward racial segregation as advanced in the Natives (Urban Areas) and Native Administration Acts. Roberts nonetheless militated against the erosion of the Cape non-racial franchise rights; he resigned from the Native Affairs Commission just as the all-white parliament was poised to remove Africans from the common voters roll. His engagement with the politics of race interfered with Robertss astronomical research. Although he published nearly one hundred papers in scientific journals most of his observational data remained unknown until the Boyden Observatorys Roberts archive was digitized in 2006. His influence as a mission educator also has been little known, although among his pupils were journalist and academic D.D.T. Jabavu, the physician James Moroka, and Swazi king Sobhuza I. This book examines the cultures of colonial science, missionary education, and racial politics in South Africa through the life of A. W. Robert, a key participant in all three fields. This study gives insight into the porous nature of categories such as missionary evangelism, . This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.