Editore: Popular Magazine Pub, 1967
Da: Comic World, Steinbach, MB, Canada
Prima edizione
EUR 13,61
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Aggiungi al carrelloSoft cover. Condizione: GOOD+. Interior Artists: Ken Riley; Dick Pahl; John Berkey (illustratore). ARGOSY Men Adventure Magazine Volume 364, #4 (April /1967; Popular Publications;) Painted Front Cover : Norman Adams 134 pages including covers; Writers: Brett Halliday; Martin Deutsch; Lew Louderback; Robert Joseph Allen; Peter Michelmore; David Ash; Gil Paust; Lord Kilbracken; Lowell Thomas; C. S. Forester; S. K. Snedegar; Milt Machlin; Jack Fields; Harry Steeger; Eric Nyborg; Gene Lowall; Hal Steeger; Bruce Cassiday; George Laycock; J. Edward Schipper; Interior Artists: Ken Riley; Dick Pahl; John Berkey; *** Book Order # ADV166-2; >> Dust shadow along 3 edges of forn tocver; mailing label to frotn cover; Size: 4to - over 9¾" - 12" tall TRUE FIRST Edition MAGAZINE Format Thus. Book.
Editore: Flying Eagle Publications, New York, 1966
Da: WF Sandercombe, Burlington, ON, Canada
Prima edizione
EUR 13,56
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Aggiungi al carrelloSoft cover. Condizione: Very Good. 1st Edition. Digest format. General wear; no interior markings. This issue contains: An Angel on Death by Roy Carroll; The Lonesome Bride by Nelson Adcock; A Deadly Secret by Beatrice S. Smith; Viking Blood by Dennis Lynds; Scandal Anyone? by Frank Gay; The Proof Is In by S. K. Snedegar; The Hand by Charles A. Freylin; Southern Comfort by Shirley Dunbar; Needle Street by J. Kenneth O'Street; Double Damned by C. G. Cunningham; and City Cop by Jack Belek. Size: 12mo. Book.
Editore: Academic Journal Offprint from: - Journal for the History of Astronomy, Supplement to Volume 29, No. 23, 1998., 1998
Da: Nar Valley Books & Prints, King's Lynn, Regno Unito
EUR 7,94
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Lingua: Inglese
Editore: Oxford University Press, GB, 2017
ISBN 10: 0198785933 ISBN 13: 9780198785934
Da: Rarewaves.com USA, London, LONDO, Regno Unito
EUR 77,00
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Aggiungi al carrelloHardback. Condizione: New. Justin Snedegar develops and defends contrastivism about reasons. This is the view that normative reasons are fundamentally reasons for or against actions or attitudes only relative to sets of alternatives. Simply put, reasons are always reasons to do one thing rather than another, instead of simply being reasons to do something, full stop. Work on reasons has become central to several areas of philosophy, but besides a couple of exceptions, this view has not been discussed. Contrastive Reasons makes the case that this is a mistake. Snedegar develops three kinds of arguments for contrastivism. First, contrastivism gives us the best account of our ordinary discourse about reasons. Second, contrastivism best makes sense of widespread ideas about what reasons are, including the idea that they favor the things they are reasons for and the idea that they involve the promotion of certain kinds of objectives. Third, contrastivism has attractive applications in different areas of normative philosophy in which reasons are important. These include debates in normative ethics about whether better than might be intransitive and debates in both epistemology and practical reasoning about the rationality of withholding or suspending belief and intention.
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ISBN 10: 0198785933 ISBN 13: 9780198785934
Da: Grand Eagle Retail, Bensenville, IL, U.S.A.
Hardcover. Condizione: new. Hardcover. Justin Snedegar develops and defends contrastivism about reasons. This is the view that normative reasons are fundamentally reasons for or against actions or attitudes only relative to sets of alternatives. Simply put, reasons are always reasons to do one thing rather than another, instead of simply being reasons to do something, full stop. Work on reasons has become central to several areas of philosophy, but besides a couple of exceptions, this view has not beendiscussed. Contrastive Reasons makes the case that this is a mistake.Snedegar develops three kinds of arguments for contrastivism. First, contrastivism gives us the best accountof our ordinary discourse about reasons. Second, contrastivism best makes sense of widespread ideas about what reasons are, including the idea that they favor the things they are reasons for and the idea that they involve the promotion of certain kinds of objectives. Third, contrastivism has attractive applications in different areas of normative philosophy in which reasons are important. These include debates in normative ethics about whether better than might be intransitive and debates inboth epistemology and practical reasoning about the rationality of withholding or suspending belief and intention. Justin Snedegar develops and defends contrastivism about reasons. This is the view that normative reasons are fundamentally reasons for or against actions or attitudes only relative to sets of alternatives. Simply put, reasons are always reasons to do one thing rather than another, instead of simply being reasons to do something, full stop. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.
Lingua: Inglese
Editore: Oxford University Press(UK), 2017
ISBN 10: 0198785933 ISBN 13: 9780198785934
Da: Kennys Bookshop and Art Galleries Ltd., Galway, GY, Irlanda
EUR 100,92
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Aggiungi al carrelloCondizione: New. Justin Snedegar develops and defends contrastivism about reasons. This is the view that normative reasons are fundamentally reasons for or against actions or attitudes only relative to sets of alternatives. Simply put, reasons are always reasons to do one thing rather than another, instead of simply being reasons to do something, full stop. Num Pages: 176 pages. BIC Classification: HPK; HPQ. Category: (G) General (US: Trade). Dimension: 216 x 135. . . 2017. hardcover. . . . .
Da: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, U.S.A.
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Da: Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Regno Unito
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Da: Chapter 1, Johannesburg, GAU, Sudafrica
Prima edizione Copia autografata
EUR 108,86
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Aggiungi al carrelloHardcover. Condizione: Very Good. No Jacket. First Edition. Signed and inscribed by the author Keith Snedegar. Publication of 189 pages. The Pictorial boards are in near fine condition. Internally the pages are clean and complete. The text is legible. The binding is excellent. GK. Our orders are shipped using tracked courier delivery services. Signed.
EUR 124,11
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Aggiungi al carrelloHardcover. Condizione: Brand New. 149 pages. 8.75x5.75x0.75 inches. In Stock.
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ISBN 10: 0198785933 ISBN 13: 9780198785934
Da: Kennys Bookstore, Olney, MD, U.S.A.
EUR 128,92
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Aggiungi al carrelloCondizione: New. Justin Snedegar develops and defends contrastivism about reasons. This is the view that normative reasons are fundamentally reasons for or against actions or attitudes only relative to sets of alternatives. Simply put, reasons are always reasons to do one thing rather than another, instead of simply being reasons to do something, full stop. Num Pages: 176 pages. BIC Classification: HPK; HPQ. Category: (G) General (US: Trade). Dimension: 216 x 135. . . 2017. hardcover. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.
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EUR 129,00
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ISBN 10: 0198785933 ISBN 13: 9780198785934
Da: Rarewaves.com UK, London, Regno Unito
EUR 71,73
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Aggiungi al carrelloHardback. Condizione: New. Justin Snedegar develops and defends contrastivism about reasons. This is the view that normative reasons are fundamentally reasons for or against actions or attitudes only relative to sets of alternatives. Simply put, reasons are always reasons to do one thing rather than another, instead of simply being reasons to do something, full stop. Work on reasons has become central to several areas of philosophy, but besides a couple of exceptions, this view has not been discussed. Contrastive Reasons makes the case that this is a mistake. Snedegar develops three kinds of arguments for contrastivism. First, contrastivism gives us the best account of our ordinary discourse about reasons. Second, contrastivism best makes sense of widespread ideas about what reasons are, including the idea that they favor the things they are reasons for and the idea that they involve the promotion of certain kinds of objectives. Third, contrastivism has attractive applications in different areas of normative philosophy in which reasons are important. These include debates in normative ethics about whether better than might be intransitive and debates in both epistemology and practical reasoning about the rationality of withholding or suspending belief and intention.
Da: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Regno Unito
EUR 180,90
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EUR 76,37
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Da: Brook Bookstore On Demand, Napoli, NA, Italia
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Da: Books Puddle, New York, NY, U.S.A.
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Da: Biblios, Frankfurt am main, HESSE, Germania
EUR 96,31
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Editore: Bloomsbury Publishing (UK), 2015
ISBN 10: 0739196243 ISBN 13: 9780739196243
Da: PBShop.store UK, Fairford, GLOS, Regno Unito
EUR 117,53
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ISBN 10: 0198785933 ISBN 13: 9780198785934
Da: CitiRetail, Stevenage, Regno Unito
EUR 78,20
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Aggiungi al carrelloHardcover. Condizione: new. Hardcover. Justin Snedegar develops and defends contrastivism about reasons. This is the view that normative reasons are fundamentally reasons for or against actions or attitudes only relative to sets of alternatives. Simply put, reasons are always reasons to do one thing rather than another, instead of simply being reasons to do something, full stop. Work on reasons has become central to several areas of philosophy, but besides a couple of exceptions, this view has not beendiscussed. Contrastive Reasons makes the case that this is a mistake. Snedegar develops three kinds of arguments for contrastivism. First, contrastivism gives us the best accountof our ordinary discourse about reasons. Second, contrastivism best makes sense of widespread ideas about what reasons are, including the idea that they favor the things they are reasons for and the idea that they involve the promotion of certain kinds of objectives. Third, contrastivism has attractive applications in different areas of normative philosophy in which reasons are important. These include debates in normative ethics about whether better than might be intransitive and debates inboth epistemology and practical reasoning about the rationality of withholding or suspending belief and intention. Justin Snedegar develops and defends contrastivism about reasons. This is the view that normative reasons are fundamentally reasons for or against actions or attitudes only relative to sets of alternatives. Simply put, reasons are always reasons to do one thing rather than another, instead of simply being reasons to do something, full stop. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.