thomas cavanna (14 risultati)

Condizione: Neuf.

Softcover. Condizione: Gut. A Lantern Pocket Book edition. 123 Seiten Eine Sammlung fesselnder und herzerwärmender Geschichten über Hunde, ausgewählt von David Thomas und geschrieben von bekannten Autoren. Die Geschichten umfassen Stadthunde, Landhunde und vieles mehr. Zustand: Einband mit stärkeren Gebrauchsspuren, Seiten geringfügig gebräunt, insgesamt GUTER Zustand. HC1-573-5/8-00592481 Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 140.

Paperback. Condizione: Brand New. French language. 8.98x5.83x1.18 inches. In Stock.

Condizione: New. In.

Condizione: fine. l'article peut presenter de tres legers signes d'usure. vendeur professionnel; envoi soigne en 24/48h.

Hardback. Condizione: New. This book describes the conduct of the US-led post-9/11 war in Afghanistan. Adopting a long-term perspective, it argues that even though Washington initially had an opportunity to achieve its security goals and give Afghanistan a chance to enter a new era, it compromised any possibility of success from the very moment it let bin Laden escape to Pakistan in December 2001, and found itself locked in a strategic overreach. Given the bureaucratic and rhetorical momentum triggered by the war on terror in America, the Bush Administration was bound to deploy more resources in Afghanistan sooner or later (despite its focus on Iraq). The need to satisfy unfulfilled counter-terrorism objectives made the US dependent on Afghanistan's warlords, which compromised the country's stability and tarnished its new political system. The extension of the US military presence made Washington lose its leverage on the Pakistan army leaders, who, aware of America's logistical dependency on Islamabad, supported the Afghan insurgents - their historical proxies - more and more openly. The extension of the war also contributed to radicalize segments of the Afghan and Pakistani populations, destabilizing the area further. In the meantime, the need to justify the extension of its military presence influenced the US-led coalition into proclaiming its determination to democratize and reconstruct Afghanistan. While highly opportunistic, the emergence of these policies proved both self-defeating and unsustainable due to an inescapable collision between the US-led coalition's inherent self-interest, hubris, limited knowledge, limited attention span and limited resources, and, on the other hand, Afghanistan's inherent complexity. As the critical contradictions at the very heart of the campaign increased with the extension of the latter's duration, scale, and cost, America's leaders, entrapped in path-dependence, lost their strategic flexibility. Despite debates on troops/resource allocation and more sophisticated doctrines, they repeated the same structural mistakes over and over again. The strategic overreach became self-sustaining, until its costs became intolerable, leading to a drawdown which has more to do with a pervasive sense of failure than with the accomplishment of any noble purpose or strategic breakthrough.

Hardback. Condizione: New. This book describes the conduct of the US-led post-9/11 war in Afghanistan. Adopting a long-term perspective, it argues that even though Washington initially had an opportunity to achieve its security goals and give Afghanistan a chance to enter a new era, it compromised any possibility of success from the very moment it let bin Laden escape to Pakistan in December 2001, and found itself locked in a strategic overreach. Given the bureaucratic and rhetorical momentum triggered by the war on terror in America, the Bush Administration was bound to deploy more resources in Afghanistan sooner or later (despite its focus on Iraq). The need to satisfy unfulfilled counter-terrorism objectives made the US dependent on Afghanistan's warlords, which compromised the country's stability and tarnished its new political system. The extension of the US military presence made Washington lose its leverage on the Pakistan army leaders, who, aware of America's logistical dependency on Islamabad, supported the Afghan insurgents - their historical proxies - more and more openly. The extension of the war also contributed to radicalize segments of the Afghan and Pakistani populations, destabilizing the area further. In the meantime, the need to justify the extension of its military presence influenced the US-led coalition into proclaiming its determination to democratize and reconstruct Afghanistan. While highly opportunistic, the emergence of these policies proved both self-defeating and unsustainable due to an inescapable collision between the US-led coalition's inherent self-interest, hubris, limited knowledge, limited attention span and limited resources, and, on the other hand, Afghanistan's inherent complexity. As the critical contradictions at the very heart of the campaign increased with the extension of the latter's duration, scale, and cost, America's leaders, entrapped in path-dependence, lost their strategic flexibility. Despite debates on troops/resource allocation and more sophisticated doctrines, they repeated the same structural mistakes over and over again. The strategic overreach became self-sustaining, until its costs became intolerable, leading to a drawdown which has more to do with a pervasive sense of failure than with the accomplishment of any noble purpose or strategic breakthrough.

Hardcover. Condizione: Brand New. 338 pages. 8.00x5.00x1.00 inches. In Stock.

Hardcover. Condizione: Very Good. Condizione sovraccoperta: Good+ DJ. Reprint. Grosset & Dunlap 1949 Reprint Very Good/Good+ DJ Light wear to red cloth with black lettering, solid structure, pos penned inside cover. Bright clipped dust jacket with light rubbing to back with mended tears and chips protected in clear Brodart dust jacket cover.

HRD. Condizione: New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

HRD. Condizione: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

Hardcover. Condizione: new. Hardcover. This book describes the conduct of the US-led post-9/11 war in Afghanistan. Adopting a long-term perspective, it argues that even though Washington initially had an opportunity to achieve its security goals and give Afghanistan a chance to enter a new era, it compromised any possibility of success from the very moment it let bin Laden escape to Pakistan in December 2001, and found itself locked in a strategic overreach. Given the bureaucratic and rhetorical momentum triggered by the war on terror in America, the Bush Administration was bound to deploy more resources in Afghanistan sooner or later (despite its focus on Iraq). The need to satisfy unfulfilled counter-terrorism objectives made the US dependent on Afghanistans warlords, which compromised the countrys stability and tarnished its new political system. The extension of the US military presence made Washington lose its leverage on the Pakistan army leaders, who, aware of Americas logistical dependency on Islamabad, supported the Afghan insurgents their historical proxies - more and more openly. The extension of the war also contributed to radicalize segments of the Afghan and Pakistani populations, destabilizing the area further. In the meantime, the need to justify the extension of its military presence influenced the US-led coalition into proclaiming its determination to democratize and reconstruct Afghanistan. While highly opportunistic, the emergence of these policies proved both self-defeating and unsustainable due to an inescapable collision between the US-led coalitions inherent self-interest, hubris, limited knowledge, limited attention span and limited resources, and, on the other hand, Afghanistans inherent complexity. As the critical contradictions at the very heart of the campaign increased with the extension of the latters duration, scale, and cost, Americas leaders, entrapped in path-dependence, lost their strategic flexibility. Despite debates on troops/resource allocation and more sophisticated doctrines, they repeated the same structural mistakes over and over again. The strategic overreach became self-sustaining, until its costs became intolerable, leading to a drawdown which has more to do with a pervasive sense of failure than with the accomplishment of any noble purpose or strategic breakthrough. This book describes the conduct of the U.S.-led post-9/11 war in Afghanistan via a long-term historical perspective. It investigates the reasons behind Washingtons entrapment in a self-sustaining overreach, emphasizing policy mistakes made in late 2001 and the contradictions associated with foreign-led democratization and state-building. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Hardcover. Condizione: new. Hardcover. This book describes the conduct of the US-led post-9/11 war in Afghanistan. Adopting a long-term perspective, it argues that even though Washington initially had an opportunity to achieve its security goals and give Afghanistan a chance to enter a new era, it compromised any possibility of success from the very moment it let bin Laden escape to Pakistan in December 2001, and found itself locked in a strategic overreach. Given the bureaucratic and rhetorical momentum triggered by the war on terror in America, the Bush Administration was bound to deploy more resources in Afghanistan sooner or later (despite its focus on Iraq). The need to satisfy unfulfilled counter-terrorism objectives made the US dependent on Afghanistans warlords, which compromised the countrys stability and tarnished its new political system. The extension of the US military presence made Washington lose its leverage on the Pakistan army leaders, who, aware of Americas logistical dependency on Islamabad, supported the Afghan insurgents their historical proxies - more and more openly. The extension of the war also contributed to radicalize segments of the Afghan and Pakistani populations, destabilizing the area further. In the meantime, the need to justify the extension of its military presence influenced the US-led coalition into proclaiming its determination to democratize and reconstruct Afghanistan. While highly opportunistic, the emergence of these policies proved both self-defeating and unsustainable due to an inescapable collision between the US-led coalitions inherent self-interest, hubris, limited knowledge, limited attention span and limited resources, and, on the other hand, Afghanistans inherent complexity. As the critical contradictions at the very heart of the campaign increased with the extension of the latters duration, scale, and cost, Americas leaders, entrapped in path-dependence, lost their strategic flexibility. Despite debates on troops/resource allocation and more sophisticated doctrines, they repeated the same structural mistakes over and over again. The strategic overreach became self-sustaining, until its costs became intolerable, leading to a drawdown which has more to do with a pervasive sense of failure than with the accomplishment of any noble purpose or strategic breakthrough. This book describes the conduct of the U.S.-led post-9/11 war in Afghanistan via a long-term historical perspective. It investigates the reasons behind Washingtons entrapment in a self-sustaining overreach, emphasizing policy mistakes made in late 2001 and the contradictions associated with foreign-led democratization and state-building. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Hardback. Condizione: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days.