Isbn: 9780199914746 - naturalism and the first person perspective (22 risultati)

Softcover. Condizione: Very Good+. Trade paperback, presumed pod edition with typical barcode on the last leaf, the book has a mild lean to the binding, slight bumps to the spine ends and corners, rubbing to the covers, and a small smudge to the head of the text block. Overall, this is a tight and clean, Very Good+ copy.…

Condizione: Good. Former library copy. Pages intact with minimal writing/highlighting. The binding may be loose and creased. Dust jackets/supplements are not included. Includes library markings. Stock photo provided. Product includes identifying sticker. Better World Books: Buy Books. Do Good.

Soft cover. Condizione: Very Good. VERY GOOD softcover, no marks in text; a very clean, gently used copy. Book.

Condizione: New. This book investigates the limits of scientific naturalism. It has three goals: (1) to show that no wholly impersonal account of reality can be adequate to all phenomena; (2) to formulate a nonCartesian account of the first-person perspective; (3) to develop a 'near-naturalism' that accommodates the world of our encounters and interactions. Num Pages: 272 pages. BIC Classification: HPM; PDA. Category: (G) General (US: Trade). Dimension: 141 x 210 x 18. Weight in Grams: 294. . 2013. Paperback. . . . .…

Condizione: New.

Condizione: New. pp. 272 Index.

Paperback. Condizione: New. Science and its philosophical companion, Naturalism, represent reality in wholly nonpersonal terms. How, if at all, can a nonpersonal scheme accommodate the first-person perspective that we all enjoy? In this volume, Lynne Rudder Baker explores that question by considering both reductive and eliminative approaches to the first-person perspective. After finding both approaches wanting, she mounts an original constructive argument to show that a nonCartesian first-person perspective belongs in the basic inventory of what exists. That is, the world that contains us persons is irreducibly personal.After arguing for the irreducibilty and ineliminability of the first-person perspective, Baker develops a theory of this perspective. The first-person perspective has two stages, rudimentary and robust. Human infants and nonhuman animals with consciousness and intentionality have rudimentary first-person perspectives. In learning a language, a person acquires a robust first-person perspective: the capacity to conceive of oneself as oneself, in the first person. By developing an account of personal identity, Baker argues that her theory is coherent, and she shows various ways in which first-person perspectives contribute to reality.…

Condizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Condizione: New. pp. 272.

Condizione: New. This book investigates the limits of scientific naturalism. It has three goals: (1) to show that no wholly impersonal account of reality can be adequate to all phenomena; (2) to formulate a nonCartesian account of the first-person perspective; (3) to develop a 'near-naturalism' that accommodates the world of our encounters and interactions. Num Pages: 272 pages. BIC Classification: HPM; PDA. Category: (G) General (US: Trade). Dimension: 141 x 210 x 18. Weight in Grams: 294. . 2013. Paperback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.…

Condizione: New. pp. 272.

Condizione: New.

Condizione: New. In English.

Paperback / softback. Condizione: New. New copy - Usually dispatched within 4 working days.

Condizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Paperback. Condizione: New. Science and its philosophical companion, Naturalism, represent reality in wholly nonpersonal terms. How, if at all, can a nonpersonal scheme accommodate the first-person perspective that we all enjoy? In this volume, Lynne Rudder Baker explores that question by considering both reductive and eliminative approaches to the first-person perspective. After finding both approaches wanting, she mounts an original constructive argument to show that a nonCartesian first-person perspective belongs in the basic inventory of what exists. That is, the world that contains us persons is irreducibly personal.After arguing for the irreducibilty and ineliminability of the first-person perspective, Baker develops a theory of this perspective. The first-person perspective has two stages, rudimentary and robust. Human infants and nonhuman animals with consciousness and intentionality have rudimentary first-person perspectives. In learning a language, a person acquires a robust first-person perspective: the capacity to conceive of oneself as oneself, in the first person. By developing an account of personal identity, Baker argues that her theory is coherent, and she shows various ways in which first-person perspectives contribute to reality.…

Condizione: new. Questo è un articolo print on demand.

PAP. Condizione: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

PAP. Condizione: New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. Science and its philosophical companion, Naturalism, represent reality in wholly nonpersonal terms. How, if at all, can a nonpersonal scheme accommodate the first-person perspective that we all enjoy? In this volume, Lynne Rudder Baker explores that question by considering both reductive and eliminative approaches to the first-person perspective. After finding both approaches wanting, she mounts an original constructive argument to show that a nonCartesian first-person perspective belongs in the basic inventory of what exists. That is, the world that contains us persons is irreducibly personal.After arguing for the irreducibilty and ineliminability of the first-person perspective, Baker develops a theory of this perspective. The first-person perspective has two stages, rudimentary and robust. Human infants and nonhuman animals with consciousness and intentionality have rudimentary first-person perspectives. In learning a language, a person acquires a robust first-person perspective: the capacity to conceive of oneself as oneself, in the first person. By developing an account of personal identity, Baker argues that her theory is coherent, and she shows various ways in which first-person perspectives contribute to reality. This book investigates the limits of scientific naturalism. It has three goals: (1) to show that no wholly impersonal account of reality can be adequate to all phenomena; (2) to formulate a nonCartesian account of the first-person perspective; (3) to develop a 'near-naturalism' that accommodates the world of our encounters and interactions. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.…

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - Science and its philosophical companion, Naturalism, represent reality in wholly nonpersonal terms. How, if at all, can a nonpersonal scheme accommodate the first-person perspective that we all enjoy In this volume, Lynne Rudder Baker explores that question by considering both reductive and eliminative approaches to the first-person perspective. After finding both approaches wanting, she mounts an original constructive argument to show that a non-Cartesian first-person perspective belongs in the basic inventory of what exists. That is, the world that contains us persons is irreducibly personal.After arguing for the irreducibilty and ineliminability of the first-person perspective, Baker develops a theory of this perspective. The first-person perspective has two stages, rudimentary and robust. Human infants and nonhuman animals with consciousness and intentionality have rudimentary first-person perspectives. In learning a language, a person acquires a robust first-person perspective: the capacity to conceive of oneself as oneself, in the first person. By developing an account of personal identity, Baker argues that her theory is coherent, and she shows various ways in which first-person perspectives contribute to reality.…

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective | Lynne Rudder Baker | Taschenbuch | 248 S. | Englisch | 2013 | Oxford University Press | EAN 9780199914746 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Oxford University Press España S.A., El Parque Empresarial San Fernando de Henares, Avendia de Castilla 2, 28830 MADRID, SPANIEN, product[dot]safety[at]oup[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand.…