building party systems developing di hicken allen (34 risultati)

Hardcover. Condizione: Very Good. No Jacket. Former library book; May have limited writing in cover pages. Pages are unmarked. ~ ThriftBooks: Read More, Spend Less 0.95.

Hardcover. Condizione: Very Good. Condizione sovraccoperta: Fine. 1st Edition. xi, 207 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm. occasional notes in pencil.

Condizione: New. In.

Hardback. Condizione: Fine. First Edition. Hardback. Dust Jacket. 8vo. pp xi, 207. Original publishers black cloth lettered silver on spine. ISBN: 0521885345 Fine in fine dust wrapper.

Condizione: New.

Condizione: New. This is a Brand-new US Edition. This Item may be shipped from US or any other country as we have multiple locations worldwide.

Condizione: Brand New. New. US edition. Excellent Customer Service.

Condizione: New. SUPER FAST SHIPPING.

Paperback. Condizione: New.

Condizione: New. pp. 224.

Condizione: New. pp. 224 19 Illus.

Brand new book. Fast ship. Please provide full street address as we are not able to ship to P O box address.

Condizione: New. pp. 224.

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This book addresses the question of why a party system with a modest number of nationally oriented political parties emerges in some democracies but not others. The number of parties and nationalization are the product of coordination between voters, candidates, and party leaders within local electoral districts and coordination among candidates and elites across districts. Candidates and voters can do and do coordinate locally in response to electoral incentives, but coordination across districts, or aggregation, often fails in developing democracies. A key contribution of this book is the development and testing of a theory of aggregation incentives that focuses on the payoff to being a large party and the probability of capturing that payoff. The book relies on in-depth case studies of Thailand and the Philippines, and on large-n analysis to establish its arguments.

Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. This book addresses the question of why a party system with a modest number of nationally oriented political parties emerges in some democracies but not others. The number of parties and nationalization are the product of coordination between voters, candidates, and party leaders within local electoral districts and coordination among candidates and elites across districts. Candidates and voters can do and do coordinate locally in response to electoral incentives, but coordination across districts, or aggregation, often fails in developing democracies. A key contribution of this book is the development and testing of a theory of aggregation incentives that focuses on the payoff to being a large party and the probability of capturing that payoff. The book relies on in-depth case studies of Thailand and the Philippines, and on large-n analysis to establish its arguments. This book addresses the question of why a party system with a modest number of nationally oriented political parties emerges in some democracies but not others. Analyzing the cases of Thailand and the Philippines, Hicken argues that aggregation incentives are a product of the payoff to being a large party and the probability if capturing that payoff. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Condizione: New. In.

Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. This book addresses the question of why a party system with a modest number of nationally oriented political parties emerges in some democracies but not others. The number of parties and nationalization are the product of coordination between voters, candidates, and party leaders within local electoral districts and coordination among candidates and elites across districts. Candidates and voters can do and do coordinate locally in response to electoral incentives, but coordination across districts, or aggregation, often fails in developing democracies. A key contribution of this book is the development and testing of a theory of aggregation incentives that focuses on the payoff to being a large party and the probability of capturing that payoff. The book relies on in-depth case studies of Thailand and the Philippines, and on large-n analysis to establish its arguments. This book addresses the question of why a party system with a modest number of nationally oriented political parties emerges in some democracies but not others. Analyzing the cases of Thailand and the Philippines, Hicken argues that aggregation incentives are a product of the payoff to being a large party and the probability if capturing that payoff. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.

Condizione: New.

Condizione: New.

Condizione: New. SUPER FAST SHIPPING.

Paperback. Condizione: new. Paperback. This book addresses the question of why a party system with a modest number of nationally oriented political parties emerges in some democracies but not others. The number of parties and nationalization are the product of coordination between voters, candidates, and party leaders within local electoral districts and coordination among candidates and elites across districts. Candidates and voters can do and do coordinate locally in response to electoral incentives, but coordination across districts, or aggregation, often fails in developing democracies. A key contribution of this book is the development and testing of a theory of aggregation incentives that focuses on the payoff to being a large party and the probability of capturing that payoff. The book relies on in-depth case studies of Thailand and the Philippines, and on large-n analysis to establish its arguments. This book addresses the question of why a party system with a modest number of nationally oriented political parties emerges in some democracies but not others. Analyzing the cases of Thailand and the Philippines, Hicken argues that aggregation incentives are a product of the payoff to being a large party and the probability if capturing that payoff. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Hardcover. Condizione: new. Hardcover. This book addresses the question of why a party system with a modest number of nationally oriented political parties emerges in some democracies but not others. The number of parties and nationalization are the product of coordination between voters, candidates, and party leaders within local electoral districts and coordination among candidates and elites across districts. Candidates and voters can do and do coordinate locally in response to electoral incentives, but coordination across districts, or aggregation, often fails in developing democracies. A key contribution of this book is the development and testing of a theory of aggregation incentives that focuses on the payoff to being a large party and the probability of capturing that payoff. The book relies on in-depth case studies of Thailand and the Philippines, and on large-n analysis to establish its arguments. This book addresses the question of why a party system with a modest number of nationally oriented political parties emerges in some democracies but not others. Analyzing the cases of Thailand and the Philippines, Hicken argues that aggregation incentives are a product of the payoff to being a large party and the probability if capturing that payoff. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Hardcover. Condizione: new. Hardcover. This book addresses the question of why a party system with a modest number of nationally oriented political parties emerges in some democracies but not others. The number of parties and nationalization are the product of coordination between voters, candidates, and party leaders within local electoral districts and coordination among candidates and elites across districts. Candidates and voters can do and do coordinate locally in response to electoral incentives, but coordination across districts, or aggregation, often fails in developing democracies. A key contribution of this book is the development and testing of a theory of aggregation incentives that focuses on the payoff to being a large party and the probability of capturing that payoff. The book relies on in-depth case studies of Thailand and the Philippines, and on large-n analysis to establish its arguments. This book addresses the question of why a party system with a modest number of nationally oriented political parties emerges in some democracies but not others. Analyzing the cases of Thailand and the Philippines, Hicken argues that aggregation incentives are a product of the payoff to being a large party and the probability if capturing that payoff. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.

Hardcover. Condizione: Brand New. 1st edition. 207 pages. 9.25x6.25x1.00 inches. In Stock.

Buch. Condizione: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This book addresses the question of why a party system with a modest number of nationally oriented political parties emerges in some democracies but not others. The number of parties and nationalization are the product of coordination between voters, candidates, and party leaders within local electoral districts and coordination among candidates and elites across districts. Candidates and voters can do and do coordinate locally in response to electoral incentives, but coordination across districts, or aggregation, often fails in developing democracies. A key contribution of this book is the development and testing of a theory of aggregation incentives that focuses on the payoff to being a large party and the probability of capturing that payoff. The book relies on in-depth case studies of Thailand and the Philippines, and on large-n analysis to establish its arguments.

Condizione: New.

Hardcover. Condizione: new. Hardcover. This book addresses the question of why a party system with a modest number of nationally oriented political parties emerges in some democracies but not others. The number of parties and nationalization are the product of coordination between voters, candidates, and party leaders within local electoral districts and coordination among candidates and elites across districts. Candidates and voters can do and do coordinate locally in response to electoral incentives, but coordination across districts, or aggregation, often fails in developing democracies. A key contribution of this book is the development and testing of a theory of aggregation incentives that focuses on the payoff to being a large party and the probability of capturing that payoff. The book relies on in-depth case studies of Thailand and the Philippines, and on large-n analysis to establish its arguments. This book addresses the question of why a party system with a modest number of nationally oriented political parties emerges in some democracies but not others. Analyzing the cases of Thailand and the Philippines, Hicken argues that aggregation incentives are a product of the payoff to being a large party and the probability if capturing that payoff. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Condizione: Fine. Number of pages: 224 Size: Hardcover.

Paperback. Condizione: Brand New. 222 pages. 8.10x5.40x0.60 inches. In Stock. This item is printed on demand.

Paperback / softback. Condizione: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days 361.