cavanna p (26 risultati)

Condizione: Good. Volume 35. This is an ex-library book and may have the usual library/used-book markings inside.This is a pamphlet. In good all round condition. Please note the Image in this listing is a stock photo and may not match the covers of the actual item,150grams, ISBN:9781851747108.

Paperback. Condizione: Very Good. Condizione sovraccoperta: None. Post reduced within the UK.

Hardcover. Condizione: Fine. Condizione sovraccoperta: Very Good + DJ. Designed By Merle Armitage, Silhouettes By Carlos Dyer, Drawings By Elise Cavanna, Lettering By William Stutz (illustratore). 1st Edition. 282 Pp. Blue Cloth, Lettered In White. Book Is Fine, No Wear Or Marks. Dj Is Very Good +, Bright Clean And Without Fading, Wear At Corners With Minute Losses, Two 3/4" Closed Tears At Top Of Front Panel.

Condizione: Buono (Good). In 8^, 23x20cm, 12 fotografi, 30 ecomusei, 68 musei della provincia di Torino. Bello, pari al nuovo. Book.

hardcover. Illustration de la chapelle de la Portioncule en frontispice, illustrations hors texte (illustratore). Perrin & Cie 1926. in-12. 296 pages. Perrin & Cie 1926. in-12. 296 pages. Nb de volume : 1. Reliure de demi-cuir brun, dos orné de motifs à quatre nerfs orné, couverture originale remonté dans la reliure, tranche supérieure dorée, bel exemplaire en très bon état . Illustration de la chapelle de la Portioncule en frontispice, illustrations hors texte .

in-4, broché, 163p. Bon état.

Tapa dura. Condizione: Bien. Ilustrado. Idioma: Italiano. 25 x 18 cm. 420 páginas. Nombre o firma de anterior propietario/a.

Condizione: BUONO USATO. ITALIANO Brossura con copertina in cartoncino semirigido in buono stato con usure da scaffale e del tempo, bordi stanchi, oscuramento generale di piatti e dorso, leggera dissolvenza del dorso il quale é anche lievemente danneggiato. Volume all' interno intatto, con pagine uniformemente ingiallite ma complessivamente in ottimo stato. Tagli irregolari. Numero Pagine 126.

xiv + 293pp.+ planches hors-texte, br.orig., 20cm.

Paperback. Condizione: New.

In-4°, legatura editoriale in cartonato e sovracoperta, pp. 340. Raccolte di Documentazione del Museo Nazionale della Montagna.

Condizione: New. In.

Hardback. Condizione: New. This book describes the conduct of the US-led post-9/11 war in Afghanistan. Adopting a long-term perspective, it argues that even though Washington initially had an opportunity to achieve its security goals and give Afghanistan a chance to enter a new era, it compromised any possibility of success from the very moment it let bin Laden escape to Pakistan in December 2001, and found itself locked in a strategic overreach. Given the bureaucratic and rhetorical momentum triggered by the war on terror in America, the Bush Administration was bound to deploy more resources in Afghanistan sooner or later (despite its focus on Iraq). The need to satisfy unfulfilled counter-terrorism objectives made the US dependent on Afghanistan's warlords, which compromised the country's stability and tarnished its new political system. The extension of the US military presence made Washington lose its leverage on the Pakistan army leaders, who, aware of America's logistical dependency on Islamabad, supported the Afghan insurgents - their historical proxies - more and more openly. The extension of the war also contributed to radicalize segments of the Afghan and Pakistani populations, destabilizing the area further. In the meantime, the need to justify the extension of its military presence influenced the US-led coalition into proclaiming its determination to democratize and reconstruct Afghanistan. While highly opportunistic, the emergence of these policies proved both self-defeating and unsustainable due to an inescapable collision between the US-led coalition's inherent self-interest, hubris, limited knowledge, limited attention span and limited resources, and, on the other hand, Afghanistan's inherent complexity. As the critical contradictions at the very heart of the campaign increased with the extension of the latter's duration, scale, and cost, America's leaders, entrapped in path-dependence, lost their strategic flexibility. Despite debates on troops/resource allocation and more sophisticated doctrines, they repeated the same structural mistakes over and over again. The strategic overreach became self-sustaining, until its costs became intolerable, leading to a drawdown which has more to do with a pervasive sense of failure than with the accomplishment of any noble purpose or strategic breakthrough.

Hardback. Condizione: New. This book describes the conduct of the US-led post-9/11 war in Afghanistan. Adopting a long-term perspective, it argues that even though Washington initially had an opportunity to achieve its security goals and give Afghanistan a chance to enter a new era, it compromised any possibility of success from the very moment it let bin Laden escape to Pakistan in December 2001, and found itself locked in a strategic overreach. Given the bureaucratic and rhetorical momentum triggered by the war on terror in America, the Bush Administration was bound to deploy more resources in Afghanistan sooner or later (despite its focus on Iraq). The need to satisfy unfulfilled counter-terrorism objectives made the US dependent on Afghanistan's warlords, which compromised the country's stability and tarnished its new political system. The extension of the US military presence made Washington lose its leverage on the Pakistan army leaders, who, aware of America's logistical dependency on Islamabad, supported the Afghan insurgents - their historical proxies - more and more openly. The extension of the war also contributed to radicalize segments of the Afghan and Pakistani populations, destabilizing the area further. In the meantime, the need to justify the extension of its military presence influenced the US-led coalition into proclaiming its determination to democratize and reconstruct Afghanistan. While highly opportunistic, the emergence of these policies proved both self-defeating and unsustainable due to an inescapable collision between the US-led coalition's inherent self-interest, hubris, limited knowledge, limited attention span and limited resources, and, on the other hand, Afghanistan's inherent complexity. As the critical contradictions at the very heart of the campaign increased with the extension of the latter's duration, scale, and cost, America's leaders, entrapped in path-dependence, lost their strategic flexibility. Despite debates on troops/resource allocation and more sophisticated doctrines, they repeated the same structural mistakes over and over again. The strategic overreach became self-sustaining, until its costs became intolerable, leading to a drawdown which has more to do with a pervasive sense of failure than with the accomplishment of any noble purpose or strategic breakthrough.

Hardcover. Condizione: Brand New. 338 pages. 8.00x5.00x1.00 inches. In Stock.

flessibile. Condizione: Come Nuovo (Mint). NO DVD. 212 p., f.to cm 24,5x21, copertina flessibile, illustrazioni a colori. Come nuovo, solo il libro. Book.

brossura hardcover. Condizione: Molto buono (Very Good). 1996. Copertina editoriale in brossura rigida e sovraccoperta alettat. 308 p.; Ill.; 25 cmPH.7. Book.

Condizione: Come Nuovo. Rimanenza di magazzino, libro nuovo che presenta difetti di copertina Dettagli LibroSku: PZZLB9968ISBN: 9788836607464Titolo: Francesco Negri Fotografo 1841-1924Autore: Barbara Bergaglio, P. CavannaEditore: SilvanaAnno: 2006Pagine: 189Formato: BrossuraFrancesco Negri (Tromello (PV) 18 dicembre 1841 - Casale Monferrato (AL), 21 dicembre 1924) è una delle maggiori personalità artistiche monferrine. Fu tra i migliori interpreti del mutamento storico dell'Italia di fine Ottocento, che vide profonde evoluzioni culturali e sociali. Come altri fotografi dell'XIX secolo sperimentò nuove tecniche e nuovi strumenti per la realizzazione delle fotografie, oltre all'invenzione del teleobiettivo, lo si ricorda per le sue realizzazioni in microbiologia che rivoluzionarono le tecniche del tempo, consentendogli di fotografare, nel 1885, il bacillo del colera.

Condizione: Perfetto (Mint). Rimanenza di edizione pari al nuovo. 9788890139604 Perfetto (Mint) .

brossura. Condizione: Buono (Good). Dedica autografa dell'autore nell'occhiello. 78 p. Buono (Good) marcati segni del tempo, alone su copertina e bordo delle pagine, firma di appartenenza sul frontespizio, pagine comunque perfettamente leggibili. Book.

Editions du Square 1969, ensemble 2 volumes In-folio reliures éditeur pleine toile beige et rouge regroupant 94 numéros du 3 février 1969 au 16 novembre 1970 et les 6 premiers numéros de Charlie hebdo du 1 au 6 inclus, 23 novembre 1970 au 28 décembre 1970. Ensemble bien complet du N° de l'Hebdo du 16 novembre 1970 "Bal tragique à Colombey-1 mort" qui générera l'interdiction de la revue ainsi que du document contrecollé sur page kraft "Interdiction de vente d'une revue aux mineurs de dix-huit ans, d'exposition et de publicité par voie d'affiches" du Ministre de l'Intérieur et du Directeur de la Police Nationale en date du 4 novembre 1970. Bel état de l'ensemble. Rare.

HRD. Condizione: New. New Book. Delivered from our UK warehouse in 4 to 14 business days. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

HRD. Condizione: New. New Book. Shipped from UK. THIS BOOK IS PRINTED ON DEMAND. Established seller since 2000.

Hardcover. Condizione: new. Hardcover. This book describes the conduct of the US-led post-9/11 war in Afghanistan. Adopting a long-term perspective, it argues that even though Washington initially had an opportunity to achieve its security goals and give Afghanistan a chance to enter a new era, it compromised any possibility of success from the very moment it let bin Laden escape to Pakistan in December 2001, and found itself locked in a strategic overreach. Given the bureaucratic and rhetorical momentum triggered by the war on terror in America, the Bush Administration was bound to deploy more resources in Afghanistan sooner or later (despite its focus on Iraq). The need to satisfy unfulfilled counter-terrorism objectives made the US dependent on Afghanistans warlords, which compromised the countrys stability and tarnished its new political system. The extension of the US military presence made Washington lose its leverage on the Pakistan army leaders, who, aware of Americas logistical dependency on Islamabad, supported the Afghan insurgents their historical proxies - more and more openly. The extension of the war also contributed to radicalize segments of the Afghan and Pakistani populations, destabilizing the area further. In the meantime, the need to justify the extension of its military presence influenced the US-led coalition into proclaiming its determination to democratize and reconstruct Afghanistan. While highly opportunistic, the emergence of these policies proved both self-defeating and unsustainable due to an inescapable collision between the US-led coalitions inherent self-interest, hubris, limited knowledge, limited attention span and limited resources, and, on the other hand, Afghanistans inherent complexity. As the critical contradictions at the very heart of the campaign increased with the extension of the latters duration, scale, and cost, Americas leaders, entrapped in path-dependence, lost their strategic flexibility. Despite debates on troops/resource allocation and more sophisticated doctrines, they repeated the same structural mistakes over and over again. The strategic overreach became self-sustaining, until its costs became intolerable, leading to a drawdown which has more to do with a pervasive sense of failure than with the accomplishment of any noble purpose or strategic breakthrough. This book describes the conduct of the U.S.-led post-9/11 war in Afghanistan via a long-term historical perspective. It investigates the reasons behind Washingtons entrapment in a self-sustaining overreach, emphasizing policy mistakes made in late 2001 and the contradictions associated with foreign-led democratization and state-building. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Hardcover. Condizione: new. Hardcover. This book describes the conduct of the US-led post-9/11 war in Afghanistan. Adopting a long-term perspective, it argues that even though Washington initially had an opportunity to achieve its security goals and give Afghanistan a chance to enter a new era, it compromised any possibility of success from the very moment it let bin Laden escape to Pakistan in December 2001, and found itself locked in a strategic overreach. Given the bureaucratic and rhetorical momentum triggered by the war on terror in America, the Bush Administration was bound to deploy more resources in Afghanistan sooner or later (despite its focus on Iraq). The need to satisfy unfulfilled counter-terrorism objectives made the US dependent on Afghanistans warlords, which compromised the countrys stability and tarnished its new political system. The extension of the US military presence made Washington lose its leverage on the Pakistan army leaders, who, aware of Americas logistical dependency on Islamabad, supported the Afghan insurgents their historical proxies - more and more openly. The extension of the war also contributed to radicalize segments of the Afghan and Pakistani populations, destabilizing the area further. In the meantime, the need to justify the extension of its military presence influenced the US-led coalition into proclaiming its determination to democratize and reconstruct Afghanistan. While highly opportunistic, the emergence of these policies proved both self-defeating and unsustainable due to an inescapable collision between the US-led coalitions inherent self-interest, hubris, limited knowledge, limited attention span and limited resources, and, on the other hand, Afghanistans inherent complexity. As the critical contradictions at the very heart of the campaign increased with the extension of the latters duration, scale, and cost, Americas leaders, entrapped in path-dependence, lost their strategic flexibility. Despite debates on troops/resource allocation and more sophisticated doctrines, they repeated the same structural mistakes over and over again. The strategic overreach became self-sustaining, until its costs became intolerable, leading to a drawdown which has more to do with a pervasive sense of failure than with the accomplishment of any noble purpose or strategic breakthrough. This book describes the conduct of the U.S.-led post-9/11 war in Afghanistan via a long-term historical perspective. It investigates the reasons behind Washingtons entrapment in a self-sustaining overreach, emphasizing policy mistakes made in late 2001 and the contradictions associated with foreign-led democratization and state-building. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Hardback. Condizione: New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days.