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Hardcover. Condizione: Très bon. Ancien livre de bibliothèque. Couverture différente. Ammareal reverse jusqu'à 15% du prix net de cet article à des organisations caritatives. ENGLISH DESCRIPTION Book Condition: Used, Very good. Former library book. Different cover. Ammareal gives back up to 15% of this item's net price to charity organizations.

gebundene Ausgabe. Condizione: Gut. 260 Seiten Das hier angebotene Buch stammt aus einer teilaufgelösten Bibliothek und kann die entsprechenden Kennzeichnungen aufweisen (Rückenschild, Instituts-Stempel.); der Buchzustand ist ansonsten ordentlich und dem Alter entsprechend gut. In ENGLISCHER Sprache. Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 625.

Gebunden. Condizione: New. Bayesian analysis is a highly effective tool in the many cases when economic decisions are based on limited or imperfect information. For students and professionals familiar with basic econometrics, this volume is an accessible entry point into the Bayesian.

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Condizione: New.

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Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Decision Making Under Risk and Uncertainty | New Models and Empirical Findings | J. Geweke | Taschenbuch | ix | Englisch | 2013 | Springer | EAN 9789401052610 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu.

Condizione: New. pp. 278.

Condizione: New. A collection of work representative of the theory of decision making under risk and uncertainty. The authors present extensions and alternatives to expected utility theory explaining diverse behaviour, including activity in financial markets, crimes of passion and the Ellsberg paradox. Editor(s): Geweke, John. Series: Theory and Decision Library B. Num Pages: 262 pages, biography. BIC Classification: KJMD. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly. Dimension: 235 x 155 x 17. Weight in Grams: 565. . 1992. Hardback. . . . .

Condizione: New. pp. 276.

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - As desired, the infonnation demand correspondence is single valued at equilibrium prices. Hence no planner is needed to assign infonnation allocations to individuals. Proposition 4. For any given infonnation price system p E . P (F \*), almost every a E A demands a unique combined infonnation structure (although traders may be indifferent among partial infonnation sales from different information allocations, etc. ). In particular, the aggregate excess demand correspondence for net combined infonnation trades is a continuous function. Proof Uniqueness fails only if an agent can obtain the same expected utility from two or more net combined infonnation allocations. If this happens, appropriate slight perturbations of personal probability vectors destroy the equality unless the utility functions and wealth allocations were independent across states. Yet, when utilities and wealths don't depend on states in S, no infonnation to distinguish the states is desired, so that the demand for such infonnation structures must equal zero. To show the second claim, recall that if the correspondence is single valued for almost every agent, then its integral is also single valued. Finally, note that an upper hemicontinuous (by Proposition 2) correspondence which is single valued everywhere is, in fact, a continuous function. [] REFERENCES Allen, Beth (1986a). 'The Demand for (Differentiated) Infonnation'; Review of Economic Studies. 53. (311-323). Allen, Beth (1986b). 'General Equilibrium with Infonnation Sales'; Theory and Decision. 21. (1-33). Allen, Beth (1990). 'Infonnation as an Economic Commodity'; American Economic Review. 80. (268-273).

Buch. Condizione: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - As desired, the infonnation demand correspondence is single valued at equilibrium prices. Hence no planner is needed to assign infonnation allocations to individuals. Proposition 4. For any given infonnation price system p E . P (F \*), almost every a E A demands a unique combined infonnation structure (although traders may be indifferent among partial infonnation sales from different information allocations, etc. ). In particular, the aggregate excess demand correspondence for net combined infonnation trades is a continuous function. Proof Uniqueness fails only if an agent can obtain the same expected utility from two or more net combined infonnation allocations. If this happens, appropriate slight perturbations of personal probability vectors destroy the equality unless the utility functions and wealth allocations were independent across states. Yet, when utilities and wealths don't depend on states in S, no infonnation to distinguish the states is desired, so that the demand for such infonnation structures must equal zero. To show the second claim, recall that if the correspondence is single valued for almost every agent, then its integral is also single valued. Finally, note that an upper hemicontinuous (by Proposition 2) correspondence which is single valued everywhere is, in fact, a continuous function. [] REFERENCES Allen, Beth (1986a). 'The Demand for (Differentiated) Infonnation'; Review of Economic Studies. 53. (311-323). Allen, Beth (1986b). 'General Equilibrium with Infonnation Sales'; Theory and Decision. 21. (1-33). Allen, Beth (1990). 'Infonnation as an Economic Commodity'; American Economic Review. 80. (268-273).

Condizione: New. A collection of work representative of the theory of decision making under risk and uncertainty. The authors present extensions and alternatives to expected utility theory explaining diverse behaviour, including activity in financial markets, crimes of passion and the Ellsberg paradox. Editor(s): Geweke, John. Series: Theory and Decision Library B. Num Pages: 262 pages, biography. BIC Classification: KJMD. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly. Dimension: 235 x 155 x 17. Weight in Grams: 565. . 1992. Hardback. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Condizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Hardcover. Condizione: Like New. Like New. book.

Condizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Paperback. Condizione: Like New. Like New. book.

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Condizione: new. Questo è un articolo print on demand.

Condizione: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. As desired, the infonnation demand correspondence is single valued at equilibrium prices. Hence no planner is needed to assign infonnation allocations to individuals. Proposition 4. For any given infonnation price system p E . P (F *), almost every a E A de.

Condizione: New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. As desired, the infonnation demand correspondence is single valued at equilibrium prices. Hence no planner is needed to assign infonnation allocations to individuals. Proposition 4. For any given infonnation price system p E . P (F *), almost every a E A de.

Buch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -As desired, the infonnation demand correspondence is single valued at equilibrium prices. Hence no planner is needed to assign infonnation allocations to individuals. Proposition 4. For any given infonnation price system p E . P (F \*), almost every a E A demands a unique combined infonnation structure (although traders may be indifferent among partial infonnation sales from different information allocations, etc. ). In particular, the aggregate excess demand correspondence for net combined infonnation trades is a continuous function. Proof Uniqueness fails only if an agent can obtain the same expected utility from two or more net combined infonnation allocations. If this happens, appropriate slight perturbations of personal probability vectors destroy the equality unless the utility functions and wealth allocations were independent across states. Yet, when utilities and wealths don't depend on states in S, no infonnation to distinguish the states is desired, so that the demand for such infonnation structures must equal zero. To show the second claim, recall that if the correspondence is single valued for almost every agent, then its integral is also single valued. Finally, note that an upper hemicontinuous (by Proposition 2) correspondence which is single valued everywhere is, in fact, a continuous function. [] REFERENCES Allen, Beth (1986a). 'The Demand for (Differentiated) Infonnation'; Review of Economic Studies. 53. (311-323). Allen, Beth (1986b). 'General Equilibrium with Infonnation Sales'; Theory and Decision. 21. (1-33). Allen, Beth (1990). 'Infonnation as an Economic Commodity'; American Economic Review. 80. (268-273). 272 pp. Englisch.

Buch. Condizione: Neu. Decision Making Under Risk and Uncertainty | New Models and Empirical Findings | J. Geweke | Buch | ix | Englisch | 1992 | Springer Netherland | EAN 9780792319047 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu Print on Demand.

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -As desired, the infonnation demand correspondence is single valued at equilibrium prices. Hence no planner is needed to assign infonnation allocations to individuals. Proposition 4. For any given infonnation price system p E . P (F \*), almost every a E A demands a unique combined infonnation structure (although traders may be indifferent among partial infonnation sales from different information allocations, etc. ). In particular, the aggregate excess demand correspondence for net combined infonnation trades is a continuous function. Proof Uniqueness fails only if an agent can obtain the same expected utility from two or more net combined infonnation allocations. If this happens, appropriate slight perturbations of personal probability vectors destroy the equality unless the utility functions and wealth allocations were independent across states. Yet, when utilities and wealths don't depend on states in S, no infonnation to distinguish the states is desired, so that the demand for such infonnation structures must equal zero. To show the second claim, recall that if the correspondence is single valued for almost every agent, then its integral is also single valued. Finally, note that an upper hemicontinuous (by Proposition 2) correspondence which is single valued everywhere is, in fact, a continuous function. [] REFERENCES Allen, Beth (1986a). 'The Demand for (Differentiated) Infonnation'; Review of Economic Studies. 53. (311-323). Allen, Beth (1986b). 'General Equilibrium with Infonnation Sales'; Theory and Decision. 21. (1-33). Allen, Beth (1990). 'Infonnation as an Economic Commodity'; American Economic Review. 80. (268-273). 276 pp. Englisch.

Buch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -As desired, the infonnation demand correspondence is single valued at equilibrium prices. Hence no planner is needed to assign infonnation allocations to individuals. Proposition 4. For any given infonnation price system p E . P (F \*), almost every a E A demands a unique combined infonnation structure (although traders may be indifferent among partial infonnation sales from different information allocations, etc. ). In particular, the aggregate excess demand correspondence for net combined infonnation trades is a continuous function. Proof Uniqueness fails only if an agent can obtain the same expected utility from two or more net combined infonnation allocations. If this happens, appropriate slight perturbations of personal probability vectors destroy the equality unless the utility functions and wealth allocations were independent across states. Yet, when utilities and wealths don't depend on states in S, no infonnation to distinguish the states is desired, so that the demand for such infonnation structures must equal zero. To show the second claim, recall that if the correspondence is single valued for almost every agent, then its integral is also single valued. Finally, note that an upper hemicontinuous (by Proposition 2) correspondence which is single valued everywhere is, in fact, a continuous function. [] REFERENCES Allen, Beth (1986a). 'The Demand for (Differentiated) Infonnation'; Review of Economic Studies. 53. (311-323). Allen, Beth (1986b). 'General Equilibrium with Infonnation Sales'; Theory and Decision. 21. (1-33). Allen, Beth (1990). 'Infonnation as an Economic Commodity'; American Economic Review. 80. (268-273).Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg 272 pp. Englisch.

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. This item is printed on demand - Print on Demand Titel. Neuware -As desired, the infonnation demand correspondence is single valued at equilibrium prices. Hence no planner is needed to assign infonnation allocations to individuals. Proposition 4. For any given infonnation price system p E . P (F \*), almost every a E A demands a unique combined infonnation structure (although traders may be indifferent among partial infonnation sales from different information allocations, etc. ). In particular, the aggregate excess demand correspondence for net combined infonnation trades is a continuous function. Proof Uniqueness fails only if an agent can obtain the same expected utility from two or more net combined infonnation allocations. If this happens, appropriate slight perturbations of personal probability vectors destroy the equality unless the utility functions and wealth allocations were independent across states. Yet, when utilities and wealths don't depend on states in S, no infonnation to distinguish the states is desired, so that the demand for such infonnation structures must equal zero. To show the second claim, recall that if the correspondence is single valued for almost every agent, then its integral is also single valued. Finally, note that an upper hemicontinuous (by Proposition 2) correspondence which is single valued everywhere is, in fact, a continuous function. [] REFERENCES Allen, Beth (1986a). 'The Demand for (Differentiated) Infonnation'; Review of Economic Studies. 53. (311-323). Allen, Beth (1986b). 'General Equilibrium with Infonnation Sales'; Theory and Decision. 21. (1-33). Allen, Beth (1990). 'Infonnation as an Economic Commodity'; American Economic Review. 80. (268-273).Springer-Verlag KG, Sachsenplatz 4-6, 1201 Wien 276 pp. Englisch.

Condizione: New. Print on Demand pp. 278 49:B&W 6.14 x 9.21 in or 234 x 156 mm (Royal 8vo) Perfect Bound on White w/Gloss Lam.