Da: Universitätsbuchhandlung Herta Hold GmbH, Berlin, Germania
EUR 18,00
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Aggiungi al carrelloXXXIII, 242 p. Hardcover. Versand aus Deutschland / We dispatch from Germany via Air Mail. Einband bestoßen, daher Mängelexemplar gestempelt, sonst sehr guter Zustand. Imperfect copy due to slightly bumped cover, apart from this in very good condition. Stamped. Theory and decision library : Series C, Game theory, mathematical programming and operations research ; Vol. 45. Sprache: Englisch.
Editore: Verlag, 1983
Da: Mullen Books, ABAA, Marietta, PA, U.S.A.
Hardcover. Condizione: VG/VG/VG. A gray casebound book. There is a red dust jacket with black text on the spine. There is an onion skin jacket over that. the end pages are illustrated. Pages: (10), 11-66, (2). Illustrated in black-and-white. There is a 28 page staplebound pamphlet in a pocket on the back inside cover, which has several color illustrations.
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Da: GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, Regno Unito
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Condizione: New. pp. 278.
Da: GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, Regno Unito
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Condizione: New. pp. 220.
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Da: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Regno Unito
EUR 79,59
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Aggiungi al carrelloHardcover. Condizione: Brand New. 2014 edition. 150 pages. 9.25x6.25x0.75 inches. In Stock.
Da: Revaluation Books, Exeter, Regno Unito
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Aggiungi al carrelloPaperback. Condizione: Brand New. reprint edition. 276 pages. 9.25x6.10x0.65 inches. In Stock.
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Aggiungi al carrelloTaschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - The monograph gives a theoretical explanation of observed cooperative behavior in common pool situations. The incentives for cooperative decision making are investigated by means of a cooperative game theoretical framework. In a first step core existence results are worked out. Whereas general core existence results provide us with an answer for mutual cooperation, nothing can be said how strong these incentives and how stable these cooperative agreements are. To clarify these questions the convexity property for common pool TU-games in scrutinized in a second step. It is proved that the convexity property holds for a large subclass of symmetrical as well as asymmetrical cooperative common pool games. Core existence and the convexity results provide us with a theoretical explanation to bridge the gap between the observation in field studies for cooperation and the noncooperative prediction that the common pool resource will be overused and perhaps endangered.
Lingua: Inglese
Editore: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2016
ISBN 10: 3662513145 ISBN 13: 9783662513149
Da: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Germania
EUR 53,49
Quantità: 1 disponibili
Aggiungi al carrelloTaschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This present book provides an alternative approach to study the pre-kernel solution of transferable utility games based on a generalized conjugation theory from convex analysis. Although the pre-kernel solution possesses an appealing axiomatic foundation that lets one consider this solution concept as a standard of fairness, the pre-kernel and its related solutions are regarded as obscure and too technically complex to be treated as a real alternative to the Shapley value. Comprehensible and efficient computability is widely regarded as a desirable feature to qualify a solution concept apart from its axiomatic foundation as a standard of fairness. We review and then improve an approach to compute the pre-kernel of a cooperative game by the indirect function. The indirect function is known as the Fenchel-Moreau conjugation of the characteristic function. Extending the approach with the indirect function, we are able to characterize the pre-kernel of the grand coalition simply by the solution sets of a family of quadratic objective functions.
Lingua: Inglese
Editore: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013
ISBN 10: 3642395481 ISBN 13: 9783642395482
Da: AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Germania
EUR 53,49
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Aggiungi al carrelloBuch. Condizione: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This present book provides an alternative approach to study the pre-kernel solution of transferable utility games based on a generalized conjugation theory from convex analysis. Although the pre-kernel solution possesses an appealing axiomatic foundation that lets one consider this solution concept as a standard of fairness, the pre-kernel and its related solutions are regarded as obscure and too technically complex to be treated as a real alternative to the Shapley value. Comprehensible and efficient computability is widely regarded as a desirable feature to qualify a solution concept apart from its axiomatic foundation as a standard of fairness. We review and then improve an approach to compute the pre-kernel of a cooperative game by the indirect function. The indirect function is known as the Fenchel-Moreau conjugation of the characteristic function. Extending the approach with the indirect function, we are able to characterize the pre-kernel of the grand coalition simply by the solution sets of a family of quadratic objective functions.
EUR 50,25
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Aggiungi al carrelloTaschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Cooperative Decision Making in Common Pool Situations | Holger I. Meinhardt | Taschenbuch | Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems | viii | Englisch | 2002 | Springer | EAN 9783540432951 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu.
Da: preigu, Osnabrück, Germania
EUR 50,35
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Aggiungi al carrelloTaschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. The Pre-Kernel as a Tractable Solution for Cooperative Games | An Exercise in Algorithmic Game Theory | Holger Ingmar Meinhardt | Taschenbuch | Theory and Decision Library C | xxxiii | Englisch | 2016 | Springer | EAN 9783662513149 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu.
EUR 30,60
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Aggiungi al carrelloSoftcover. Condizione: Gut. Gebraucht - Gut Zustand: Gut, VIII, 205 pp. About this book: The monograph gives a theoretical explanation of observed cooperative behavior in common pool situations. The incentives for cooperative decision making are investigated by means of a cooperative game theoretical framework. In a first step core existence results are worked out. Whereas general core existence results provide us with an answer for mutual cooperation, nothing can be said how strong these incentives and how stable these cooperative agreements are. To clarify these questions the convexity property for common pool TU-games in scrutinized in a second step. It is proved that the convexity property holds for a large subclass of symmetrical as well as asymmetrical cooperative common pool games. Core existence and the convexity results provide us with a theoretical explanation to bridge the gap between the observation in field studies for cooperation and the noncooperative prediction that the common pool resource will be overused and perhaps endangered. Written for researchers.
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EUR 124,77
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Aggiungi al carrelloCondizione: As New. Unread book in perfect condition.
Da: Mispah books, Redhill, SURRE, Regno Unito
EUR 115,27
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Aggiungi al carrelloPaperback. Condizione: Like New. Like New. book.
Da: GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, U.S.A.
EUR 145,79
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Da: Buchpark, Trebbin, Germania
EUR 42,88
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Aggiungi al carrelloCondizione: Sehr gut. Zustand: Sehr gut | Seiten: 276 | Sprache: Englisch | Produktart: Bücher | This present book provides an alternative approach to study the pre-kernel solution of transferable utility games based on a generalized conjugation theory from convex analysis. Although the pre-kernel solution possesses an appealing axiomatic foundation that lets one consider this solution concept as a standard of fairness, the pre-kernel and its related solutions are regarded as obscure and too technically complex to be treated as a real alternative to the Shapley value. Comprehensible and efficient computability is widely regarded as a desirable feature to qualify a solution concept apart from its axiomatic foundation as a standard of fairness. We review and then improve an approach to compute the pre-kernel of a cooperative game by the indirect function. The indirect function is known as the Fenchel-Moreau conjugation of the characteristic function. Extending the approach with the indirect function, we are able to characterize the pre-kernel of the grand coalition simply by the solution sets of a family of quadratic objective functions.
EUR 50,48
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Aggiungi al carrelloCondizione: Sehr gut. Zustand: Sehr gut | Sprache: Englisch | Produktart: Bücher | The monograph gives a theoretical explanation of observed cooperative behavior in common pool situations. The incentives for cooperative decision making are investigated by means of a cooperative game theoretical framework. In a first step core existence results are worked out. Whereas general core existence results provide us with an answer for mutual cooperation, nothing can be said how strong these incentives and how stable these cooperative agreements are. To clarify these questions the convexity property for common pool TU-games in scrutinized in a second step. It is proved that the convexity property holds for a large subclass of symmetrical as well as asymmetrical cooperative common pool games. Core existence and the convexity results provide us with a theoretical explanation to bridge the gap between the observation in field studies for cooperation and the noncooperative prediction that the common pool resource will be overused and perhaps endangered.
Da: Mispah books, Redhill, SURRE, Regno Unito
EUR 144,98
Quantità: 1 disponibili
Aggiungi al carrelloHardcover. Condizione: Like New. Like New. book.
Condizione: New.