hans gersbach (68 risultati)

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Gut. 150 Seiten Das gebrauchte Taschenbuch ist sehr gut erhalten. Sprache: Deutsch Gewicht in Gramm: 180.

Heft; Condizione: Gut. 30 Seiten; Das hier angebotene Heft stammt aus einer wissenschaftlichen Bibliothek und trägt die entsprechenden Kennzeichnungen (Rückenschild, Instituts-Stempel.). Einband etwas staubschmutzig; ansonsten ordentlicher Erhaltungszustand. Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 80.

1st ed. 2017. XII, 248 p. Hardcover. Versand aus Deutschland / We dispatch from Germany via Air Mail. Einband bestoßen, daher Mängelexemplar gestempelt, sonst sehr guter Zustand. Imperfect copy due to slightly bumped cover, apart from this in very good condition. Stamped. Sprache: Englisch.

Hardcover. Condizione: Very Good. No Jacket. First Edition. From a university library with the usual stamps and labels. Apart from the library provenance a clean tight copy. A00001226.

Condizione: New. pp. 260 52:B&W 6.14 x 9.21in or 234 x 156mm (Royal 8vo) Case Laminate on White w/Gloss Lam.

Condizione: New. pp. 260.

Condizione: New. This is a Brand-new US Edition. This Item may be shipped from US or any other country as we have multiple locations worldwide.

Condizione: New. pp. 260.

Hardcover. First ition edition. Very Good/None (33809) No jacket, believed as issued. Hardcover, very good condition, w. ltly rubbed brds, sme lt marks. A few scratches, sm scrapes on sp. V. ltly slanted, v. ltly compressed sp. A few lt dents on brd bottoms. V. ltly tanned p. edges. Clean, tight, unmarked. 243.

Condizione: New. In.

Condizione: New. In.

Condizione: New. In.

Condizione: New. In.

Paperback. Condizione: New.

Condizione: New. Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 2017 edition NO-PA16APR2015-KAP.

Condizione: New. pp. 170.

Condizione: New. pp. 260.

Condizione: New. In.

Condizione: New. In.

Hardcover. Condizione: Brand New. 186 pages. 9.25x6.25x0.50 inches. In Stock.

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Designing Democracy | Ideas for Better Rules | Hans A. Gersbach | Taschenbuch | xi | Englisch | 2010 | Springer | EAN 9783642061219 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu.

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Groups and Markets | General Equilibrium with Multi-member Households | Hans Gersbach (u. a.) | Taschenbuch | x | Englisch | 2018 | Springer | EAN 9783319868769 | Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg, juergen[dot]hartmann[at]springer[dot]com | Anbieter: preigu.

Gebunden. Condizione: New. Set of new - and as yet untried - proposals for changing the functioning of democracies for the betterWhile liberal democracies are the best systems of self-governance for societies, they rarely invoke great enthusiasm. On the one hand, democracies have.

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - While liberal democracies are the best systems of self-governance for societies, they rarely invoke great enthusiasm. On the one hand, democracies have been known to fail in achieving efficient or fair allocations. On the other hand, many citizens take the democratic system for granted as they have yet to experience an alternative. In this book the vision we propose is that the potential of democ racies has not yet been exhausted, and that optimal democracies are both the Utopia for societies and the aim that scientists should be committed to. We present a number of ideas for drawing up new rules to im prove the functioning of democracies. The book falls into two parts. The first part examines ways of combining incentive contracts with democratic elections. We suggest that a judicious combina tion of these two elements as a dual mechanism can alleviate a wide range of political failures, while at the same time adhering to the founding principles of democracies. The second part presents new rules for decision-making and agenda setting. Together with modern communication devices, these rules can sometimes transcend the limitations of liberal VI Preface democracies in achieving desirable outcomes. Examples of such rules include the flexible majority rule where the size of the ma jority required depends on the proposal, or the rule that only those belonging to the winning majority can be taxed.

Hardcover. Condizione: Like New. LIKE NEW. SHIPS FROM MULTIPLE LOCATIONS. book.

Buch. Condizione: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - While liberal democracies are the best systems of self-governance for societies, they rarely invoke great enthusiasm. On the one hand, democracies have been known to fail in achieving efficient or fair allocations. On the other hand, many citizens take the democratic system for granted as they have yet to experience an alternative. In this book the vision we propose is that the potential of democ racies has not yet been exhausted, and that optimal democracies are both the Utopia for societies and the aim that scientists should be committed to. We present a number of ideas for drawing up new rules to im prove the functioning of democracies. The book falls into two parts. The first part examines ways of combining incentive contracts with democratic elections. We suggest that a judicious combina tion of these two elements as a dual mechanism can alleviate a wide range of political failures, while at the same time adhering to the founding principles of democracies. The second part presents new rules for decision-making and agenda setting. Together with modern communication devices, these rules can sometimes transcend the limitations of liberal VI Preface democracies in achieving desirable outcomes. Examples of such rules include the flexible majority rule where the size of the ma jority required depends on the proposal, or the rule that only those belonging to the winning majority can be taxed.

Condizione: New. Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 2017 edition NO-PA16APR2015-KAP.

Hardcover. Condizione: Brand New. 248 pages. 9.50x6.25x0.75 inches. In Stock.

Taschenbuch. Condizione: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Could democracy do better This book presents a vision on optimal democracies and a set of new rules to help achieve them. The monograph follows on the author's successful book 'Designing Democracy' from 2005 and further develops its ideas. While liberal democracies are the best systems of self-governance for societies, they rarely provoke great enthusiasm. Democracies have been known to fail in achieving efficient outcomes and fair distributions of wealth. Moreover, many citizens take the democratic system for granted, simply because they have yet to experience an alternative. This book argues that the potential offered by democracies has not yet been exhausted, and that optimal democracies are both the Utopia for societies and the aim that scientists should commit themselves to making a reality. Furthermore, the book suggests a number of insightful rules to improve the functioning of democracies.'We all know what to do, we just don't know how to get re-elected after we have done it.' This famous quip by Jean-Claude Juncker perfectly encapsulates the challenge this book takes on: how to redesign our democratic institutions to overcome political short-termism and make our democracies more efficient. Several radical but highly relevant proposals are explored, ranging from long-term incentive contracts for politicians, prediction markets over the outcomes of the next election that could be useful for incentive purposes, minority voting, initiative group constitutions, and so on. All these highly innovative proposals are rigorously grounded in standard economic analysis. I highly recommend this book to anyone concerned about the state of our democracies and looking for constructive reforms.Patrick Bolton, Columbia University, USAIn a time of reeling democracies, it is urgent to explore how to improve on the electoral system for the benefit of society. Hans Gersbach has developed a most innovative and thought-provoking research agenda at the intersection of political theory, social choice and mechanism design. He uncovers the potentially positive effects of political contracts between candidates and society, of new rules for agenda setting and of mechanisms compensating the minorities. Marc Fleurbaey, Princeton University, USA.

Buch. Condizione: Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Could democracy do better This book presents a vision on optimal democracies and a set of new rules to help achieve them. The monograph follows on the author's successful book 'Designing Democracy' from 2005 and further develops its ideas. While liberal democracies are the best systems of self-governance for societies, they rarely provoke great enthusiasm. Democracies have been known to fail in achieving efficient outcomes and fair distributions of wealth. Moreover, many citizens take the democratic system for granted, simply because they have yet to experience an alternative. This book argues that the potential offered by democracies has not yet been exhausted, and that optimal democracies are both the Utopia for societies and the aim that scientists should commit themselves to making a reality. Furthermore, the book suggests a number of insightful rules to improve the functioning of democracies.'We all know what to do, we just don't know how to get re-elected after we have done it.' This famous quip by Jean-Claude Juncker perfectly encapsulates the challenge this book takes on: how to redesign our democratic institutions to overcome political short-termism and make our democracies more efficient. Several radical but highly relevant proposals are explored, ranging from long-term incentive contracts for politicians, prediction markets over the outcomes of the next election that could be useful for incentive purposes, minority voting, initiative group constitutions, and so on. All these highly innovative proposals are rigorously grounded in standard economic analysis. I highly recommend this book to anyone concerned about the state of our democracies and looking for constructive reforms.Patrick Bolton, Columbia University, USAIn a time of reeling democracies, it is urgent to explore how to improve on the electoral system for the benefit of society. Hans Gersbach has developed a most innovative and thought-provoking research agenda at the intersection of political theory, social choice and mechanism design. He uncovers the potentially positive effects of political contracts between candidates and society, of new rules for agenda setting and of mechanisms compensating the minorities. Marc Fleurbaey, Princeton University, USA.